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11. SUMMARY
1.1. Introduction
The goal of this project is to construct a prototype system which
demonstrates the feasibility of computer-aided decision-making in flight
operations. The project consists of four phases as follows:
Phase 1. Analysis of Flight Operation and Identification of Tasks
Phase 2. Computer-Aided Decision-Making with Simple Tasks
Phase 3. Computer-Aided Decision-Making with Complex Tasks
Phase 4. Computer-Aided Decision-Making Demonstration with an 
Actual Aircraft Simulator
The work reported here represents progress under Phase 2 of this 
project. This covers the period January 1, 1974 to December 31, 1974. The 
technical objective of Phase 2 is to achieve the goal of constructing a 
simple system for the purposes of demonstrating the feasibility of computer- 
aided decision-making in the realm of simple tasks. This system was completed 
on schedule and a successful demonstration was given on February 6, 1975 at 
the Coordinated Science Laboratory. The purpose of this report is to document 
the progress achieved in some detail for later reference. During the course 
of this work a great deal was learned regarding problem-solving technique for 
computer-aided decision-making, communication problems between various programs 
in a large software system, and man-machine interface considerations. These 
insights will undoubtedly prove to be invaluable to any person or team who 
is interested in the development of large scale software systems in general, 
and to people interested in automation in particular. Based on this belief
2we have included in this report not only results and achievments but also an 
indepth analysis of the related areas of investigation.
1.2. The Aircraft Model
In order to create a realistic environment for the development and 
testing of CADM software we have constructed on integrated software model 
functionally similar to the twin-jet aircraft and its operating enrironment. 
The model operates in real time and consists of three major programs -- the 
Subsystem Simulation, the Aerodynamic Simulation, and the Vertical Situation 
Display Driver.
The Aerodynamics Simulation is a digital simulation of an aircraft 
with four degrees of freedom. The program simulates all aircraft motions 
except yaw and side force. It is integrated with the aircraft Subsystem 
Simulation and the Vertical Situation Display program. Inputs to the Aero­
dynamic Simulation come from the control stick, throttles, and subsystem 
simulation. The aircraft simulated is a single seat, twin-jet engine, 
variable geometry fighter much like that proposed in the IIPACS documents. 
Details of the aircraft characteristics are given in Sections 2.1 and 3.1.
Bank, pitch, heading, altitude, airspeed, command altitude, and 
other states established by the Aerodynamic program in engineering units 
are input to the Vertical Situation Display (VSD) program.
The general task area for the demonstration of simple tasks for 
CADM was degraded mode operations. This task required a model with several 
constraints. The model had to simulate hardware readily identified with 
aircraft systems. The chosen hardware had to be capable of failure modes.
3Both the pilot and CADM had to be able to control the components of the 
model. The resultant model was named the Subsystem Simulation.
The aircraft Subsystem Simulation model consists of two fuel tanks, 
four valves, two tank drain pumps, one intertank pump, two engine pumps, two 
thrust levers, and two engines. The valve and plumbing network allows either 
fuel tank to feed either or both engines. In addition, the software produces 
sensor outputs and failure characteristics.
Simulated failures are generated by a Gremlin program. Pumps and 
valves can be jammed into any current state. The fuel tanks can be empty, 
partially filled or full, and affect the center of gravity (C.G.) of the 
aircraft. The engines produce thrust proportional to fuel flow subject to 
the following Gremlin induced failures: engine destruction with no thrust
regardless of fuel flow; engine fire with reduced thrust available; and 
flame out with no thrust.
The combined effect of the Subsystem Simulation, the Aerodynamic 
Simulation and the VSD simulation is only a first order approximation to what 
really is found in a modern twin-jet aircraft system, but even this crude 
approximation can be a challenge for pilot and CADM software. If the Gremlin 
and a side task are in full effect the pilot is more than occupied and is 
in need of assistance, the environment demonstrated the crucial need for 
thought in the design of man-machine interface (cooperative intelligence) 
software and an efficient data management system.
1.3. Computer-Aid Decision-Making For Flight Operations
The purpose of this project is to develop the conceptual framework
4of a computer-aided system to relieve the pilot from high workload in flight 
operations. This objective is achieved by designing a system with programmed 
intelligence to assist the pilot in various tasks such as fuel management, 
weapon delivery, communications, navigation, and degraded mode operations.
The emphasis during Phase 2 is in degraded mode operations. This emphasis 
was chosen because of a number of reasons. First, such a system provides the 
pilot with an increased level of confidence. Such a system also incorporates 
many of the necessary ingredients for other areas of study, namely, the 
processing of sensory data from various components in an aircraft, the 
identification of tasks, and the execution of tasks. Because of the inherent 
combinatorial complexity it is not possible to approach it in an exhaustive 
way. In order to achieve the desired capability, artificial intelligence 
techniques are applied. Among the techniques used are pattern-directed 
invocation of procedures, demons and self-generated special purpose 
procedures. Using these techniques a system is successfully implemented 
with a flexible control structure which is capable of performing the functions 
of 1) the detection of failures, 2) the correction of failures and 3) the 
monitoring of the effects of the correction procedure to determine its degree 
of success.
The detailed characteristics of a failure depends heavily on the 
context. The correction procedure employed takes into account contextual 
information, pilot presence and degree of degradation.
The control structure is designed to possess the following
factors:
1) That "most critical" failure is attended first;
52) correction should be attempted in such a way as to minimize 
conflicts of purposes as well as needed equipment;
3) that CADM be capable of recognizing pilot actions and intentions, 
and to act in concert with them.
CADM maintains a list of all failures that is presently being 
corrected. It also monitors progress closely.
The system is flexible enough to operate in a dynamic, real-time 
environment. It is capable of correcting multiple failures. It tries to 
minimize CADM internal conflects and conflicts with the pilot. Internal 
conflicts are resolved using a flexible priority structure. The program 
is able to decide what failures have occurred, order the failures according 
to a easily modifiable priority scheme, and select a correction measure with 
respect to the available resources.
This system incorporates a flexible, multi-level control structure 
capable of handling a large class of problems requiring decision making. New 
error correction and detection procedures for new failure types can easily 
be added to the system by a programmer or CADM itself.
1.4. Other Developments
Although the successful demonstration in Phase 2 is primarily a 
demonstration of the system's capability of decision-making in degraded 
mode operations, a number of other advancement have been achieved. These 
achievements are instrumental to our success and they are quite useful in 
any large system where the communication between a large number of computer 
programs become essential.
The success of the system, in real time, depends upon the timely 
transfer of data and information between the subsystem and the CADM program.
The exhibition of the solution depends on the timely transfer of the status 
to the display program. These are but two isolated examples of the very high 
degree of interaction necessary for the coordinated intelligent behavior of 
the system. The successful implementation of our system and its speedy 
decision-making performance is a direct result of our ingenious organization 
of the overall system and the solution of the communication problem between 
programs. We believe these technique are of direct usefulness to other systems 
of similar magnitude.
1.5. Future Plans
During Phase 2 we have successfully demonstrated fundamental 
promises of an intelligent system with decision-making capabilities for 
degraded mode operations. The work planned for Phase 3 will be an extension 
both in depth and in scope.
The present failure models will be expanded to include dynamic 
ordering so that actions will be context sensitive. The degree of interaction 
between CADM and the pilot will be expanded. A more powerful control struc­
ture will be installed to improve decision-making ability in the light of 
uncertainty.
In addition, we will seriously investigate the addition of a suitable 
navigation system so that a variety of new and challenging problems can be 
tackled.
CADM as a problem-solver will expand its data-base and perform
7logical (not probabilistic) deduction and decision making including some adap­
tive features for acquiring knowledge from experience.
CADM will be expected to perform with imprecise, imperfect, and 
possibly conflicting data. We will also enhance the symbiotic relationship 
between the pilot and CADM.
82. A PROTOTYPE COMPUTER-AIDED DECISION-MAKING 
SYSTEM FOR FLIGHT OPERATIONS
2.1. Aircraft Models
The CADM project required construction of an integrated software 
model functionally similar to the twin-jet aircraft and its operating environ­
ment. The model had to be capable of operation in real time and function in the 
laboratory for the developers of the CADM software and hardware. The model 
had to be simple enough that extraneous effort was not expended on its 
construction, yet not so simple that it was not a realistic reflection of 
the parameters that a CADM program needs to manipulate in actual aircraft.
The ultimate restraint of staying within the capabilities of the computer 
operating system and transmission bandwidths available to our group also was 
a basis for many decisions on building the software.
Creating a real time model meant linear approximations were used 
whenever possible and extraneous details were omitted. Trade-offs had to 
be made between the programming language, the ease of using it and the 
efficiency of its operation. The components of our aircraft model were 
chosen such that the model could have a failure with a recognizable piece 
of hardware clearly at fault. In some cases further hardware was made 
available for backup or fixing a problem so that the decision maker had 
some alternative actions.
Three major programs —  the Subsystem Simulation, the Aerodynamic 
Simulation, and the Vertical Situation Display driver -- establish the 
accepted reality of the environment of the entire simulation against which 
all other models are judged: other simulations may internalize models of
9what the environment is doing and will do, but only in conjunction with the 
basic background environment in these three major programs.
The programming environment assumed by these modeling programs is 
shown in Figure 1. The Gremlin is a program which takes directions from a 
human observer on what hardware items are to fail. Master Monitor is the 
interface program between the subject pilot and the simulated aircraft 
systems. CADM is the title of the program which performs the computer aided 
decision making for the pilot. The Pilot Model is the program which monitors 
the pilot's behavioral activities, such as joystick movement or thrust lever 
movement, to aid CADM in understanding what the pilot is doing. The Controls 
and Display are the programs which handle the VSD, thrust levers, and joystick. 
The shared data base is the central buss for passing information between the 
different programs which are required in the entire simulation. It consists 
of a list of integers whose order and meaning were agreed upon by the various 
programmers in the group before writing their software.
The simulation was built as if many more than the two actual 
processors were available. This was possible because of the time sharing 
capabilities of the PDP-10 and the universal access to the central shared 
data base, Aerodynamic Simulation.
2.1.1. Specifications
The Aerodynamic Simulation is a digital simulation of an aircraft 
with four degrees of freedom. The program simulates all aircraft motions 
except yaw and side force. It is integrated with the aircraft Subsystem 
Simulation and the Vertical Situation Display program. Inputs to the 
Aerodynamic Simulation come from the control stick, throttle, and the
10
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Subsystem Simulation.
The aircraft being simulated is a single seat, twin jet engine, 
variable geometry fighter much like that proposed in the IIPACS documents.
The engines are of the 10,000 pound thrust class. Wing sweep is set at 25 
degrees and aircraft speed is restricted to a range of 0.2 mach to 0.8 mach. 
Altitude is limited to flight levels below 10,000 feet. The aircraft is 
restrained from pitch angles greater than + or - 80 degrees. The bank angle 
is also restricted to angles of less than 80 degrees. These restraints are 
applied so that the linear equations of motion may be used. Since we wish 
only to investigate the cruise flight regime these restraints do not impede 
the utility of the simulation.
2.1.2. Flight Equations
Aircraft flight is governed by a series of dynamic equations 
derived from Newton's laws of motion. These equations are set in a reference 
frame that in the case of this simulation, is fixed to the aircraft. In this 
so-called "body axis" frame, the x axis is along the aircraft centerline 
running from the tail to the nose. The origin of the frame is at the center 
of gravity of the aircraft with the positive direction being out the nose.
The y axis runs through the wings and is positive out the right wing. The 
z axis is positive up and is perpendicular to the xy plane. This frame is 
shown in Figure 2.
The center of gravity is the point where the aircraft is balanced. 
The aircraft is considered to maneuver around this point and it is the center 
of all moments. The center of gravity is the location of the aircraft's 
mass in point-mass analyses. When the controls (ailerons, throttles,
12
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elevator) are activated, they create moments around the various axes. These 
moments cause the aircraft to maneuver around the C.G. and the aircraft will 
continue in this dynamic maneuver until the controls are centered. When the 
controls are centered, the aircraft, if it is stable, will tend to stay in 
the attitude it has assumed, since all the forces and moments will be balanced; 
thrust equals drag and lift equals weight, etc. Only the activation of the 
controls can change the attitude of the aircraft. Outside factors, such as 
turbulence can cause the aircraft to be disturbed from this equilibrium 
position by causing an imbalance in the forces on the aircraft and appro­
priate control movements must be made to rebalance the aircraft.
The sum of the forces and moments on the aircraft give the equa­
tions of motion, which when analyzed for the various components, give seven 
equations with 1 independent variable and 13 dependent variables. Solving 
these equations for the variables gives the appropriate data for display and 
motion in an aircraft simulator. The specific equations used are available 
in Section 3.1 of this report.
2.1.3. Implications and Limitations
The linear equations of flight used in the Aerodynamic Simulation 
allow sufficient flexibility to simulate a fairly wide range of flight 
conditions in the cruise flight regime. The program is an approximation 
of the linear equations, yet offers advantages over a more exact duplication 
of those equations. The program has a good representation of an aircraft in 
flight while neglecting many of the small or unimportant aerodynamic effects 
that are present in the complete equations. Thus the program is simple to 
code, easy to use, and can be easily modified to include any effects that
14
we may later wish to include.
The elimination of yaw, side forces, and side velocities restricts 
somewhat the utility of the simulation. The reduction in the fidelity of the 
simulation caused by the elimination is small in comparison to the reduction 
in complexity of both the code and the attendant hardware (rudder pedals, 
more instruments in the cockpit). For the uses we intend, i.e. cruse flight 
maneuvers, yaw and side forces are not considered to be important enough 
variables to warrant their inclusion in the simulation. If at some later 
point more complex maneuvers or other flight regimes are to be considered, 
the simulation can be modified to include the above variables, with a cor­
responding increase in complexity and computation time.
2.1.4. Vertical Situation Display (VSD) Simulation
Bank, pitch, heading, altitude, airspeed, command attitude, and 
other states established by the Aerodynamic program in engineering units 
are input to the Vertical Situation Display (VSD) program, which is written 
in BLISS-11. The VSD program recasts these data into line and alphanumeric 
commands for a CRT display such that the subject pilot views a display 
similar to a VSD. Figure 3 is a diagram of the VSD.
The program starts by building the static elements of the VSD.
These are the airplane symbol, heading pointer altimeter skeleton, rate 
of climb skeleton. The static elements are stored in a buffer and thereafter 
are read only by the CRT drawing routines.
The dynamic elements are built in a separate buffering system. One 
buffer is built then passed on to the CRT drawing routines for display. While 
the CRT drawing routines are refreshing the CRT, the VSD program builds the
15
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next dynamic display in another buffer. When this buffer is completed it is 
passed on to the CRT drawing routines.
The old buffer is reclaimed and the next dynamic display is built 
in it. This double buffering system operates continuously until the program 
is terminated by the operator. The dynamic section calls a data acquisition 
subroutine to get the required dynamic parameters for positioning the dynamic 
elements on the CRT. The joystick and thrust levers values are read and 
scaled.
The shared data base is brought in. This brings in measured thrust 
and center of gravity information. The Aerodynamic Simulation is called and 
returns the new pitch, roll, speed, rate of climb, altitude, and heading 
information.
Now the dynamic section starts building one of its double buffers.
The compass bar is positioned under the pointer, the rate of climb bar is 
scaled to the appropriate length and direction, the altimeter pointer is 
positioned, the airspeed is printed out, the command symbol and attitude 
indicator are positioned. The just built buffer is then exchanged for the 
current display buffer and the top of the dynamic display program is again 
started.
2.1.5. Subsystem Simulation
The general task area for the simple demonstration of CADM was 
degraded mode operations. This task required a model with several constraints. 
The model had to simulate hardware readily identified with aircraft systems. 
The chosen hardware in the model had to be capable of failure modes. Both 
the pilot and CADM had to be able to control the components of the model.
1.7
Lastly, the model had to be simple enough that it would not exceed the avail­
able computing resources. The resultant model was named the Subsystem Simula­
tion. For ease of programming, the computer language used was FORTRAN with 
some assembly language subroutines.
The aircraft Subsystem Simulation model consists of two fuel tanks, 
four valves, two tank drain pumps, an intertank pump, two engine pumps, two 
thrust levers, and two engines. The interconnection of this hypothetical 
hardware is shown in Figure 4. The valve and plumbing network allows either 
fuel tank to feed either or both engines. In addition, this software sub­
system produces sensor outputs and failure characteristics.
The Gremlin program generates the failure status of aircraft at 
any given time and stuffs this into the shared data base. The Subsystem 
Simulation inputs this failure status information from the shared data base 
and incorporates it into the model. Pumps and valves can be jammed in any 
current state. The fuel tanks can be empty, partially filled, or full and 
affect the center of gravity (C.G.) of the aircraft. The engines produce 
thrust proportional to fuel flow subject to the following Gremlin induced 
failures: engine destruction with no thrust regardless of fuel flow; engine
fire with reduced thrust available; and flame out with no thrust regardless 
of fuel flow.
A variety of sensors outputs are available to the other simulation
programs:
1. Fuel available in two tanks.
2. Fuel flow to two engines.
3. Measured thrust from each engine.
Figure 4
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4. Measured temperature in each engine.
5. Measure vibration modulation of each engine.
A main program controls flow of the Subsystem Simulation program 
by cycling through a series of calls to sub-programs responsible for emulating 
the various components of the subsystem. A table which summarizes the 
activities of the Subsystem Simulation is available in Figure 5. First the 
entire shared data base is read and any failures specified by Gremlin are 
acknowledged by setting internal flags as to the state of valves, pumps, and 
engines. Control settings specified by CADM or Master Monitor are implemented, 
if not prevented by Gremlin. For example, the CADM program may ask that a 
fuel drain pump be turned on. Regardless of whether the pumps previous state 
was on or off, the pump state will be set "on" if Gremlin has not specified 
that that pump is jammed. If Gremlin has jammed the pump then the pump 
state cannot be changed from its previous state.
The fuel flow in the plumbing network is a function of four 
variables. These are as follows:
1. Availability of fuel.
2. State of valves in the plumbing network.
3. State of fuel pumps.
4. Amount of demand thrust.
The subsystem fuel simulation determines what the current plumbing network 
will allow in fuel flow because of valve states. There are 156 possible 
routes for fuel flow in the network. A route for fuel is feasible if the 
fuel is available in the source tank or tanks, if the pump to force the fuel 
is on, and if the valve controlling the fuel line is open.
20
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For the intertank fuel line, the direction of flow is determined by 
the state of the intertank pump. The rate of flow is either zero or the maximum 
rate allowed by the intertank pump. The state of the pump is under control of 
the Gremlin, CADM software, the pilot via Master Monitor, or the Subsystem Simu­
lation program itself when the auto tank leveling function is enabled.
The drain fuel lines have only one direction of flow, which is out­
bound from the appropriate source tank. The state of the pump is determined 
by Gremlin, CADM software, and the pilot. The flow rate is the maximum allowed 
by the drain pumps.
The engine fuel lines direction of flow is from source tanks to the 
engines. The state of the valves and pumps are determined by the Gremlin, 
the pilot, and the CADM software. The rate of fuel flow through an engine 
pump is zero or that rate specified by the demand thrust from the pilot's 
thrust lever. The fuel rate through the plumbing is zero or the rate 
required by the engine pumps. If two pipes have fuel flow into the same 
pump, each pipe carries half the fuel load.
The engine simulations are the next subprograms called with the 
preceding work setting up the fuel flow to each engine. The amount of 
actual thrust produced by each engine, called measured thrust, is equal to 
the demand thrust if the following prerequisites for normal engine opera­
tions are met:
1. Engine state not destroyed.
2. Engine state not fire
3. Fuel flow to the engine not zero
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If the fuel flow is zero, or the engine state is destroyed, the 
measured thrust is zero. A destroyed engine state is nonrecoverable. A flame- 
out, no ignition in the engine, caused by fuel starvation is recoverable. The 
procedure for recovery is to re-establish the fuel flow to the engine and 
perform an engine start function. Either the pilot or the CADM software may 
issue an engine start. The Subsystem Simulation responds by attempting 
reignition of the engine and resetting the engine start function.
The engine destroyed state is set by Gremlin. The fuel flow to the 
engine is established by the previously described Subsystem Software. This 
means that fuel starvation can occur from pilot or CADM software blunders, 
as well as from deliberate failure settings from the Gremlin.
The measured thrust will be half the demand thrust if the engine 
state is fire. The engine fire state is set by the Gremlin and is reset by 
turning off the fuel flow to the engine. The engine is now in a flameout 
state. To obtain thrust again start fuel flow back into the engine and issue 
an engine start function. In this simulation there is no penalty for attempting 
an engine start after a fire. A general clean up of state flags is performed 
and the specific items in the shared data base for which the Subsystem 
Simulation is responsible are updated. Example items are engine temperature, 
vibration, and fuel flow. The end of the cycle has been reached and the top 
of the cycle is again started.
The combined effect of the Subsystem Simulation, the Aerodynamic 
simulation, and the VSD simulation is only a first order approximation to 
what really is found in a modern twin jet aircraft system, but even this 
approximation can be a challenge for pilot and CADM software. If the Gremlin
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and a side task are in full effect the pilot is more than occupied and in need 
of assistance in manipulating this first order approximation of aircraft reality. 
The environment demonstrates the crucial need for thought in design of man- 
machine interface (cooperative intelligence) software and an efficient data 
handling system. The modeling programs also provide a concrete vehicle for 
discussion of what really comprise aircraft systems and what the limitations 
of the equipment in these systems are.
When serious problems occur, there may be no alternatives for the 
pilot —  many significant failures are not correctable. Some, like having 
one empty fuel tank, can be "fixed," but for the most part in-air repairs 
are not possible. But with the aid of a CADM system, small failures can be 
isolated and prevented from escalating; the pilot can be alerted that some 
capability has been lost; and future planning for both pilots and CADM 
systems can take these failures into account early in the flight.
2.2. The CADM Program
2.2.1. Introduction
The Computer Aided Decision Making (CADM) program is intended to 
aid the pilot of the future by relieving him from routine monitoring and low 
level task executions. This objective is achieved by designing a computer 
system with "soft" intelligence —  the kind of intelligence that exhibits 
flexibility and accommodation for different operating environments.
The problems involved in developing a CADM to assist in various 
flight operations such as fuel management, weapon delivery, communications, 
navigation, and degraded mode operations were considered. As the project
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progressed, the emphasis fell on the investigation and implementation of new 
techniques for degraded mode operations. This choice satisfies the project 
goal in many ways. First, such a system with decision making capabilities 
will provide the pilot with an increased level of confidence and an added 
capability to successfully carry out his mission. Secondly, degraded mode 
operations incorporate many of the desirable ingredients for other areas of 
study in computer aided decision making. Examples include the processing of 
sensory data from various components in an aircraft, the identification of 
tasks which CADM should carry out, and the execution of these tasks. Finally, 
the problem domain, because of its complexity and novelty, serves as an 
excellent research vehicle for developing new automation techniques for 
advanced aircraft.
However, because of this complexity, it would be very difficult to 
implement such a system using conventional techniques. The failures could 
occur at any time and arbitrary combinations of failures are common. It is 
not feasible to anticipate all of the possible combinations of failures and 
their proper corrections. In order to achieve the desired capability, artifi- 
intelligence techniques are applied. Among the techniques used are pattern 
directed invocation of procedures, demons and self-generated special purpose 
procedures. Using these techniques allows the implementation of a system 
with a flexible control structure in which new types of failures, detection 
and correction procedures can be easily added.
The problem of degraded mode operations can be broken down into 
several stages -- the detection of failures, correction of failures and 
monitoring the effects of the correction procedure to determine its success.
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The major considerations in implementing these stages are the following.
What are the effective detection and correction procedures for failures?
If a failure cannot be corrected, how can a graceful degradation be achieved?
In other words, what is the procedure for reallocating the available resources 
so that the failure has the least effect on an aircraft as a whole? Conse­
quently what detection and correction procedures are appropriate in a degraded 
mode? These are the issues which must be resolved. Equally important is the 
symbiotic relationship between the CADM program and the pilot. Our program 
aids the pilot in a relatively "quiet" manner within its domain of capacity.
An interaction occurs when high level instruction from the pilot is needed.
2.2.2. Problem Formulation
The detail characteristics of a failure depends largely on the 
context, i.e. the mode of operation of an aircraft. A particular combina­
tion of sensor readings may indicate a failure in an aircraft component under 
one mode of operation, while the same set of readings may be interpreted as 
"normal" under a different situation. For example, in a non-degraded situation 
a zero flow of fuel into an engine is considered as the consequence of a 
failure in either the fuel pumps or the valves. On the other hand, in a 
degraded mode such as one engine down or destroyed, a non-zero flow of fuel 
into the downed engine would represent a failure in the valves and/or the 
pumps. The method in which a failure is corrected is dependent upon the 
degree of degradation. As degradation occurs, some of the most "efficient" 
apparatus may become damaged or unavailable. Alternate methods of correction 
must be employed.
When detecting failures, it is not feasible to consider all the
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possible combinations of sensor readings. For this implementation, it was 
not desired to employ any sort of a priori probability assignments to failures. 
The aim was for a system which would automatically generate and execute a set 
of relevant detection procedures in a flexible manner.
Along with correcting isolated failures, it is necessary to consider 
cases in which failures occur simultaneously or within a short time period. If 
a system handles failures on a first-come-first-serve basis, it is possible 
that correcting a failure will delay the correction of a more serious failure. 
CADM should recognize that the corrective procedure for a failure may be related 
to the procedure for others. Of particular concern is the case in which the 
corrective procedure for one failure conflicts with another. For example, 
a failure may require that a certain control be set in one state, and the 
corrective procedure for another failure may require the same control to be 
set in another state. There must be some mechanism for resolving such conflicts 
as well as deciding the most effective order of correction.
The pilot, as the information manager, should be informed of, yet 
not overloaded by, the status information. And he should have control over 
the results of the decision making programs at all times. In other words, 
the CADM programs should not be competing with the pilot for the control 
settings, but aid him in the background. If, for any reason, a conflict 
exists between what the pilot does and CADM's corrective procedures, it must v 
be resolved in a flexible way. CADM must be aware of the pilot's actions 
and be able to interpret their effects on the applicability of all corrective 
procedures.
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2.2.3. Control Structure
The CADM must be able to operate in varying environments. The 
environments may change because the airplane configuration can be altered. 
Different types of failures would mean that different corrective procedures 
would be necessary. To accomplish this, the control structure was implemented 
in a manner which allows easy introduction of new failure types and corrective 
procedures.
This same flexibility allows CADM to alter its own correction 
procedures and failure detection criteria. This means that CADM can change 
its action for different degrees and types of degradation. As new types of 
failures such as jams are determined, corrective procedures dependent on 
the malfunctioning apparatus could be altered or removed.
Among the performance criteria which influenced the design of the 
control structure were:
1) It was desired that the "most important" failures be attended to 
first. This necessitated the inclusion of a priority structure.
2) Without interfering with (1), an attempt should be made to correct 
errors in such a manner that internal conflict is minimized. When 
correcting two simultaneous failures, an attempt should be made to 
apply procedures which use different apparatus. This implies the 
need for a protection mechanism to indicate and reserve equipment 
needs for the corrections.
3) The corrections generated by CADM should be methods which involve 
the least conflict with any pilot actions. CADM tries to complement 
the pilot's actions rather than to compete with him for use of the
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available equipment.
4) As a consequence of (3), CADM must be able to recognize pilot 
actions and determine how these actions affect failures which 
have been corrected and are being monitored, as well as those 
that are presently being corrected.
This CADM control structure is shown in Figure 6.. This program is 
written in MACLISP to operate on the PDP-10 computer.
When an error is detected by CADM, the program must maintain informa­
tion such as who is responsible for correcting the error and how the correction 
is being accomplished. This information is stored on the lists as shown in 
Figure 1. ERROR-LIST contains all of the errors which CADM has detected but 
has not acted upon. These errors will be ordered from highest to lowest 
priority.
ACTIVE-LIST is a list of all the failures that CADM is presently 
correcting. Included on this list are the methods being employed to correct 
each failure. CADM takes the view that just because action was taken (by 
turning switches) which was expected to correct a failure, it cannot assume 
that the failure has been corrected. CADM monitors the progress of the cor­
rection procedure until a success or failure is determined.
DEMON-MESSAGE *s entries indicate whether the existing error 
correcting procedures have succeeded or failed. The top level of CADM is 
able to use this information to aid in developing its future plans.
PILOT-LIST contains information concerning errors which CADM 
has not been able to correct. These include errors which cannot be 
corrected due to irreconcilable CADM-pilot conflicts or because the
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degree of degradation renders all of CADM's possible techniques unsuitable.
The general flow of control is independent of a specific error or 
error-type. When CADM inputs new data from the common CADM database, two 
types of information are input: sensor readings and current valve setting.
CADM's detection procedures (which will be described in the next section) are 
used to report if any failures were detected as well as if any pilot actions 
have interfered with existing corrections. In the latter case, the correction 
procedure which was being used will be suspended and further analysis will be 
performed. In the former case, CADM checks to insure that the detected error 
is not already being dealt with by the pilot or CADM itself.
New errors cause correction routines to be invoked. A successful 
correction routine will alter equipment and valve settings while implementing 
the correction. Any conflicts with the pilot and/or CADM will be resolved 
at this time. When the correction routines implement a possibly successful 
approach, monitoring routines are established to insure that the procedure 
is indeed successful. Detailed discussion of the correction routines and 
monitoring programs will be covered in following sections. After a procedure 
has been implemented and is being monitored, CADM is free to correct other 
errors which it has already detected or to return to the common database 
for new data. New corrections, however, cannot use apparatus for corrections 
in progress without generating a conflict which must be resolved in the new 
error's favor.
2.2.4. Failure Detection
CADM operates in a simple aircraft domain with 20 sensor readings 
and 12 pump and valve settings. It is not practical to build a decision tree 
that incorporates all the possible combinations for all the failures. Operating
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in a more complicated airplane model would necessitate a great deal of rewriting 
to include new sensor combinations. Much of the flexibility is lost if the 
detection apparatus is in the form of a big flow chart.
What is desired is a method of keying on important sensor readings and 
examining for failures when the readings change. It is also necessary to be 
able to introduce detection procedures representing new types of failures as 
well as altered criteria for failures, easily and in a straight-forward manner.
In order to accomplish this, CADM's detection procedures are pattern-invoked.
Each procedure has a pattern associated with it. A pattern is a template, a 
list composed of constants and variables. This means that a program can be 
called not only by name, but also when a datum matching the program's pattern 
is entered into the internal CADM database. Datum representing a sensory input 
can directly invoke a program. This program is referred to as a DETECTION DEMON. 
Because of this, sensor reading data do not have to be checked needlessly.
Another advantage is that such pattern-invoked programs are easy to add into 
the program base without disturbing the calling sequences and branching of 
the logic that alieady exist.
The DETECTION DEMONS are of the form:
( name [pattern] [body] )
where [pattern] takes the forms of the sensor reading data containing variables 
representing new sensor values. [body] is a decision procedure which define 
the criteria for detecting the error. The following is a simple example of 
such a pattern invoked detection program. It is used to detect flame-out on 
an engine.
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(FLAME-OUT (?SIDE VIBR (RESTRICT ? FLAME-OUT)) 1
(AND
(PRESENT (=?SIDE TEMP (RESTRICT ? FLAME-OUT-TEMP))) 2
(NOT (IN (LIST FIRE (LIST ?SIDE)) ACTIVE-LIST)) 3
(PUSH (LIST TIME FLAME-OUT (LIST ?SIDE))
ERROR-LIST)) 4
In Line 1, a DETECTION-DEMON is defined to detect a flame-out. The 
body can be invoked whenever a datum list is entered into the database which 
has as its first element a side. In the present airplane model, ?side, a 
variable, would be bound to either LEFT or RIGHT. The second element of 
the datum must be the constant VIBR. The third element must be a numerical 
value which is restricted to the defined vibration range for a flame-out. 
Examples of data which would invoke this demon are: (LEFT VIBR 20), (RIGHT
VIBR 24), (RIGHT VIBR 0). Line 2 checks for the temperature of the ?SIDE 
engine. The temperature must be in the flame-out range. Line 3 checks to 
make sure that the low temperature is not caused by a previous correction 
of a fire on the ?SIDE engine, which would have caused a lower temperature. 
This correction would appear in the ACTIVE-LIST. In line 4 the program adds 
to the ERROR-LIST that a flame-out has been detected.
The same type of DETECTION-DEMON structure is used to observe any 
pilot changes in valve or pump settings. If changes are found to have 
occurred, CADM can assess their relevence to failures being corrected and 
take appropriate action, such as suspending the correction.
2.2.5. Failure Correction
CADM examines the ERROR-LIST containing all of the recently 
detected errors in order to eliminate errors which are already being 
corrected. The entries are re-ordered so that the highest priority error
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will be corrected first. CADM maintains a list of all of the error types 
that it recognizes along with their relative priorities. This list of priori­
ties can be altered by the program when new information indicates that the 
priorities should be changed. Whenever CADM corrects a failure, the first 
entry on the ERROR-LIST is examined and the relevant corrective routines 
are invoked. At this point CADM cannot know which procedure will eventually 
be applied to correct the failure. It only is aware that a class of correction 
procedures exists. These procedures are collected into an outline, called a 
CPROG, for each error type. This outline is used to determine in which order 
the individual procedures are examined. An example of a corrective procedure 
is:
(DEFUN FLAME-OUT (X)
(CPROG STEP1 (FLAME-OUT-RESTART)
STEP2 (FLAME-OUT-PUMP-RESTART)
STEP3 (FLAME-OUT-FORWARD-RESTART)
STEP4 (FLAME-OUT-REAR-RESTART)
STEP5 (FLAME-OUT-WRAP-UP) ) )
Each step in the outline represents a possible approach to correcting the 
problem. CADM goes through the possibilities in order searching for one which 
it judges to be appropriate. A correction procedure is generally comprised of 
three sections. First, does the state of the world represent the proper environ 
ment? In each procedure CADM wants to alter the settings for valves and pumps, 
but it also requires that certain valves or pumps be previously on or off. If 
these requirements are not met, the procedure is deemed to be unsuitable and 
the next procedure is examined.
Second, CADM must determine if it is free to alter the desired valves 
or pumps. It does this by checking to see if there are any restrictions on 
the required apparatus. The present CADM recongizes three types of restriction:
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jam, pilot conflicts and internal CADM conflicts. In the case of a jam, 
altering a switch will serve no purpose, so the procedure is deemed to be 
inapplicable. CADM attempts to correct as many failures as it can without 
conflict. If a conflict is discovered, the conflicting procedure is saved, 
and another procedure is examined. CADM will try to resolve the conflict only 
if there are no non-conflict solutions.
Third, when a procedure is found which CADM wishes to apply, the 
valve and/or pumps are reset. In order to insure that the repair has pro­
gressed successfully, a program that monitors the correction must be constructed. 
This will be discussed in the following section.
If after examining all of the possible procedures, a non-conflict 
solution is not found, CADM returns to those in which a conflict was found 
and tries to resolve the conflict. The first conflicts checked are those 
with on-going, internally generated corrections. CADM uses the same priority 
structure used to order ERROR-LIST to determine which error should have control 
over the conflicting apparatus. If the new error has a lower priority than 
the existing one, the conflict will be resolved in favor of the solution in 
progress. If the opposite is true, the older correction (with a lower 
priority) will be temporarily suspended so that the new solution can be 
implemented. Subsequently, a new solution, not involving conflicts will be 
attempted.
The last type of conflict which is resolved is the pilot-CADM 
conflict. This is because the CADM philosophy is to lessen the pilot work 
load rather than to increase it. In this implementation a pilot conflict 
is generated when the pilot changes a relevant switch within a given time
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period (in this case, within the last minute). Presently CADM does not try 
to interpret pilot actions, it only recognizes that these actions occur. 
Future implementations will try to understand the pilot’s goals and reasons. 
(See section on Man-Machine Interaction) In order to resolve this type of 
conflict, CADM asks the pilot whether it is permissible to alter a pilot 
controlled setting. An affirmative answer resolves the conflict in CADM's 
favor. A negative reply causes CADM to search for another solution. If 
CADM cannot correct an error it reports FAILURE if no conflicts were 
encountered, CONFLICT if only pilot conflicts were encountered, or nothing 
if only internal conflicts were present. In the last case, a correction will 
be attempted again when the conflict is removed.
Each of the procedures can also return a recommendation of what 
the next procedure should be examined. So, if a procedure determines that 
not only is it inapplicable, but also that the next two procedures to be 
investigated are also not relevant, a recommendation can be made to skip 
over them.
2.2.6. Monitoring Programs
When a failure is being corrected, it is not realistic to have 
the CADM assume that just because certain switch settings have been altered, 
that the error no longer exists. Rather, CADM should wait to insure that 
the expected response to the action occurs. However, it is not practical 
for CADM to stand idle during this waiting time. To avoid this, monitoring 
procedures are constructed for each correction of a failure at the time of 
correction. Each monitoring program is of the form:
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(IF [SUCCESS-PREDICATE]
THEN [SUCCESS-PROGRAM]
IF [SUCCEEDING-PREDICATE]
THEN [SUCCEEDING-PROGRAM]
ELSE [FAILURE-PROGRAM]
SUCCESS-PREDICATE is the test for complete success. When this predicate is 
satisfied, the system knows that the error has successfully been corrected. 
SUCCESS-PROGRAM is the program to be executed when the correction succeeds.
This program releases reserved equipment, activates routines which update the 
internal lists, and could be used to allow any desired procedure to be invoked. 
Consider the case in which there is a fuel imbalance. The SUCCESS-PREDICATE 
would specify that when the levels in both tanks are equal, the correction 
has succeeded. The SUCCESS-PROGRAM to be carried out after a complete success 
is NORMALIZE which in effect brings the control settings back to the state 
before the correction. If the inter-tank pump has to be turned on, it is 
turned off. If certain valves were turned off to force more fuel consumption 
from one tank, they are turned back on. SUCCEEDING-PREDICATE and SUCCEEDING- 
PROGRAM are similar items for the succeeding case. Normally, some bookkeeping 
is done while the correction in progress is succeeding. FAIL-PROGRAM is the 
program to execute when the correction does not succeed.
These detection procedures are to be invoked after a certain amount 
of time has elapsed. This can be accomplished by allowing the monitoring 
procedure to be invoked by new values of time. The pattern invoked mechanism 
which was employed during detection of failures is also used here. A demon 
known as a MONITORING-DEMON is created. The pattern contains a time variable. 
The body contains the monitoring procedure and information to restrict the 
times when it can be invoked and reinvoked. When a MONITORING-DEMON has
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served its purpose (either a success or failure has been observed), it is 
removed from the system.
After the MONITORING-DEMON has been created, the ACTIVE-LIST is 
updated to include the present failure, how the failure is being corrected 
and the name of the MONITORING-DEMON which is monitoring the correction.
2.2.7. Conclusion
A system has been implemented to aid the pilot in the detection 
and correction of failures in aircraft with respect to the problems found in 
degraded mode operations.
The program is capable of detecting and correcting a class of 
failures in an aircraft, such as engine flame out, engine fire, and fuel 
imbalance, based on the model of a twin-jet aircraft described elsewhere in 
this report.
The control structure must be flexible and the system must be able 
to operate in a dynamic, real time environment. The system has the capability 
to correct multiple failures. It tries to minimize CADM internal conflicts 
and conflicts between the pilot and CADM. Internal conflicts can be resolved 
using a flexible priority structure. The program is able to decide what failures 
have occurred, order the failure according to a easily modifiable priority 
scheme, select a correction measure, with respect to the available resource, 
and generate special purpose monitoring programs for the correction.
This implementation incorporates a flexible, multi-level control 
structure capable of handling a large class of problems requiring decision 
making. New error correction and detection procedures for new failure types 
can easily be introduced into the system by a programmer or CADM itself.
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This implementation demonstrates how the application of artificial 
intelligence techniques such as demons and pattern-invoked procedures allow 
the construction of a flexible system. Further developments in artificial 
intelligence, especially solution of those problems found in realistic, real­
time environments would permit the implementation of CADM systems which would 
be very difficult to construct using conventional programming techniques.
2.3. The PILOT/CADM Interface
In this section, we consider interfacing the PILOT with CADM. There 
are two main issues. The first is the choice of displays and controls while 
the second is task allocation and the resolution of conflicts between the 
PILOT and CADM.
2.3.1. Displays and Controls
During this phase of the CADM project, we have concentrated on 
computer-aided failure detection and correction. Thus, we want to consider 
displays specifically for that purpose. Hughes' Master Monitor Display (MMD) 
[Hughes, 1974] is for display of failure detection information. Since their 
design was based on a thorough human factors study, we need not duplicate 
their work in determining the appropriate display parameters. However, 
several extensions of MMD are necessary for our purposes.
Since our studies of CADM are not yet being carried out in an 
actual aircraft, the numerous dials, gages, knobs, switches, etc. are not 
available for the pilot to observe sensor information and input control 
decisions. Thus, we have extended MMD to include a "sensors" display and 
a "controls" display as well as the "failure monitor" display. These
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displays are illustrated in Figures 7, 8, and 9.
The sensors display gives the PILOT both quantitative and qualita­
tive information. The actual values of thrust, fuel flow, etc. are available 
if needed, while the low, normal, and high information allows the PILOT to 
make a quick check of status without having the focus long enough to perceive 
the actual value.
The green, yellow, and red notation appears on all of the displays.
When one of these indicators is "ON", CADM perceives the system to be performing 
satisfactorily without CADM assistance. Green indicates that CADM is performing 
some task(s), but expects no difficulty in accomplishing them. Yellow indicates 
that CADM is performing some task(s) and does not feel it can accomplish them, 
but can perform some holding action until the PILOT can divert his attention 
to the task. Red indicates that CADM is in trouble and needs the PILOT'S 
assistance immediately.
The controls display shows the PILOT the current settings of his 
controls (except for thrust and control sticks). To change the state of a 
control, he presses the key with the appropriate number. At the moment, a 
standard keyboard is being used for such input, but we would not advocate such 
a device for operational implementation.
The failure monitor display shows the pilot the status of the possible 
failures in his aircraft. Correction as well as detection information is 
displayed. /
All of these displays would have to be expanded and perhaps made 
hierarchical if an actual aircraft were being considered. In a real aircraft 
there are too many sensors, controls, and possible failures to put each set
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on a single display. Even with the current limited size of these sets of 
information, a hierarchy could be used to display schematics and checklists 
perhaps in a manner similar to Hughes' MMD. However, we should stress CADM's 
decision making abilities which result in the pilot not having to resort to 
such low level information very often.
2.3.2. Task Allocation and Conflict Resolution
In a later discussion on the general topic of human interaction
with an intelligent computer (see Section 4.2), the concept of competitive*
and cooperative intelligence are considered. The basic idea of cooperative 
intelligence is that responsibility should be allocated so that the pilot and 
CADM do not needlessly compete and possibly produce jointly counterproductive 
decisions.
The suggested approach to the design of a cooperatively intelligent 
system is to have CADM monitor the PILOT, as well as the aircraft, and to 
adapt its procedures to the pilot's actions and perceptions. Since it is not 
reasonable to have CADM directly ask the pilot what he is doing, we need some 
method of inferring the pilot's perceptions and predicting his actions. In 
this section, we discuss a first-cut at such a method.
Before discussing the issues involved and the approach being 
considered, we should pause to emphasize that we are not advocating complete 
elimination of direct PILOT-CADM dialogue. It may be necessary and desirable 
for the pilot and CADM to converse directly on major issues. However, if the 
pilot and CADM must directly discuss the myriad of minor issues that may 
arise, pilot workload may increase beyond what it was without CADM.
Continuing with the discussion of an approach to monitoring the
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PILOT, we should first briefly review the PILOT'S role in the demonstration 
system developed during this phase of the project. The PILOT has two basic 
tasks. The first is two-dimensional pursuit tracking of the command bar on 
the VSO. The second task is monitoring his subsystems for possible failures 
and initiating corrective actions when he deems them necessary. In the second 
task, he has CADM as an aid. However, this does not mean that he can ignore 
his subsystems since CADM may not be able to solve a particular problem or, 
in fact, could fail itself.
Because CADM is not infallible, the PILOT may decide to take his 
own corrective actions, or, quite possibly, the PILOT will instinctively 
react to a failure and forget CADM exists. Also, the PILOT may simply make 
a mistake and initiate what, out of context, would appear to be a corrective 
procedure. In all these situations, CADM should adapt itself to the PILOT 
and thus avoid competition with the PILOT.
To indirectly determine what the PILOT is doing, four sources of 
information are available. These include sensor readings, control settings 
on the MMD keyboard, joystick and thrust stick outputs, and CADM's failure 
perceptions. We want to integrate all of this information and infer the 
PILOT'S perceptions and classify them into three categories.
1. The PILOT has not detected any failures,
2. The PILOT has detected a specific error (perhaps 
unconciously), but is not attempting to correct it, and
3. The PILOT has detected a specific error and is attempting 
to correct it.
Sensor readings, control settings and when the PILOT last changed
45
them, thrust stick outputs, and CADM's perceptions of failures are readily 
available. However, these all relate to the PILOT'S task of interacting 
with CADM to monitor the aircraft's subsystems. The joystick outputs relate 
to the PILOT'S task of controlling the aircraft. It would seem that the 
performance on this control task would be related to the workload placed on 
the PILOT by the detection and correction task.
We might use RMS tracking error as a measure of control task per­
formance, but such a measure is very sensitive to the input commands. In 
other words, variations in RMS tracking errors may be due to turbulence or 
the PILOT changing course. Instead of using tracking errors, we have chosen 
to "fit" a model to the PILOT-aircraft system and use the parameters resulting 
from this fitting process as measures of performance.
Before discussing a specific model, we should consider some of the 
basic issues involved. An overriding constraint on the approach is that the 
model parameters must be identified in real time. Thus, the model must be 
simple. However, the PILOT'S tasks are complicated. For example, he often 
takes his hand off the joystick completely to momentarily devote his atten­
tion elsewhere. Long samples might smooth over this intermittency, but 
would also smooth over some interesting time varying attributes of the model 
parameters. To use short samples, we have to heuristically discard data 
when the joystick is producing no output.
Besides these technical issues, we are faced with the problem 
that there is no agreement in the literature about what models and parameters 
are appropriate measures of performance. However, it is not within the scope
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or mandate of this project to resolve this issue. Thus, we will work with 
an existing model to study the feasibility of real-time identification of 
its parameters and usage of those parameters as measures of performance.
The natural choice is McRuer's simple crossover model [McRuer,
1969]. This two-parameter model has been used successfully to describe the 
performance of well-trained subjects in one-dimensional compensatory tracking 
tasks. For our two-dimensional pursuit tracking task, we will assume that 
the model can be applied to each axis (pitch and bank) independently. Since 
the pitch and bank axes of the aircraft (see Section 2.1) are actually coupled, 
the independence assumption is not really justified. However, until we can 
prove the feasibility of real time identification of a two-parameter non­
linear model, we will avoid any elaborations of the model.
A block diagram of this approximate PILOT-aircraft system is shown 
in Figure 4. The desired pitch and bank angles come from the VSD, the output 
is the actual pitch and bank angles which are also shown on the VSD.
The discrete equations for the crossover model shown below are 
fit to the pilot-airplane system by measuring tracking errors and actual 
pitch and bank. At this point, the pilot's reaction time, is assumed to be 
constant and equal to .2 seconds. Thus the gains, and are the only outputs 
of the fitting process. Eventually the PILOT'S time delay will not be 
assumed to be constant, and will also be an output parameter of the 
identification process.
eA(t) = 9A(t"A't) + Ke At eE(t‘T)
0A (t) “ 0A (t-At) + K0 At 0E(t-T)
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At this point, the modeling of the PILOT in real time requires the 
use of two (2) computer programs, one is located in the PDP-11 with the dis­
play programs. Here, PILOT output is rapidly sampled and stored. At 
prescribed intervals, the data is transferred to the second program, HUMN-10, 
in the PDP-10. Then, the data is analyzed to obtain gain values for the pitch 
and bank axes. The eventual implementation of the high speed interface 
should allow a single program to perform these tasks. By controlling the 
input data, the PILOT output gains should lie within a specified range when 
he is devoting his full attention to tracking the desired pitch and bank 
angles. If the PILOT'S attention is divided among tracking and failure 
detection or correction, his tracking performance will degrade and should 
be reflected by the model gains.
By using the model gain information along with the sensor readings, 
control settings, and CADM's perceptions, the PILOT'S perceptions are predicted.
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CADM can utilize these predictions when deciding on a course of action.
A statement concerning the pilot’s perceptions is only made after 
CADM has indicated that a specific failure has occurred. It would be 
extremely difficult to make a prediction without this information, since 
PILOT use of a specific control might be a response for a number of failure 
correction procedures. An example and flow diagram follows, describing the 
logic used in this phase to make predictions of the PILOT'S perceptions.(Fig. 11)
To consider a specific example, assume that the right engine is 
on fire and the PILOT is initially unaware of the problem. After CADM detects 
the failure, HUMN-10 will check to see if the model gain outputs are abnormal 
or if the PILOT has applied any of the possible correction procedures. If 
not, the program replies that the PILOT has not detected the fire. Then, 
as the aircraft begins to lose power, he will probably concentrate his 
efforts on determining the problem source, causing his tracking performance 
to degrade. If this occurs within a preset time period after the failure, 
HUMN-10 replies that the PILOT has detected a failure, but has not begun 
correction procedures. After the PILOT has located the cause, he may use 
a number of correction procedures. He may (1) reduce his right thrust stick,
(2) turn off the right fuel pump, or (3) close the valve(s) from the front 
and/or rear tank to the right engine. After any of these actions aret
performed by the PILOT, again within a preset time period, HUMN-10 states 
that the PILOT has attempted to correct the fire. Finally, after CADM 
determines the failure to be corrected, HUMN-10 resets its perceptions. If 
CADM is working properly, and the PILOT does not detect the problem
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immediately, he may never be aware of the problem, as CADM could correct it 
before it is detected by the PILOT. Of course, this depends on the severity
of the failure and it is unlikely that an engine fire, or at least the
i
consequences, would go unnoticed by the pilot.
Although the monitoring method described above is rather elementary, 
its implementation will provide an indication of the feasibility of the 
general approach. Especially, we will be able to assess the constraints 
real-time processing imposes upon the system. Possible extensions include 
the use of more sophisticated PILOT models and statistical hypothesis 
testing.
Another possible use of the model parameters is to aid CADM in 
detecting failures. The PILOT may be compensating for a failure, yet not 
realize it exists. CADM could use this information, reflected as changes 
in model parameters, as part of its sensor data patterns.
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3. FURTHER TECHNICAL DISCUSSION
3.1. Communications
One major impediment in the development of this demonstration has 
been the problem of establishing a simple and efficient means of inter­
process and inter-processor communication. In this section, we will discuss 
the need for such communication, how it is currently being accomplished, and 
our future plans.
3.1.1. Why Communications
The need for inter-processor communication is obvious, since the 
graphics and part of the aircraft simulation is on a PDP-11 and the CADM and 
remainder of the simulation is on a PDP-10.
Not so obvious is the need for interprocess communication. The 
use of languages is one of the primary reasons. Some languages are better 
suited for certain tasks than others. For example, for problems in "reasoning" 
involving rather abstract symbol manipulation, LISP and is descendents are 
most convenient for prototype system development. BLISS is well suited for 
string manipulation and data management tasks. Finally, FORTRAN is well 
suited to "number-crunching" tasks. It is thus necessary for a number of 
programs, written in different languages to communicate. While this could 
have been accomplished by using a set of assembly language subroutines to 
provide the common linkage, this was not done for two reasons.
First, with a substantial number of people doing programming, it 
is very desirable if each person can run and debug his module largely 
independent of the other modules. This would be difficult to do if the
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system were one program.
Second, FORTRAN and LISP contain no provision for multitasking.
Since an aircraft contains several systems which operate simultaneously, it 
is necessary that any effective simulation of an aircraft simulate this 
parallelism. When not using languages with multitasking facilities built 
in, it is most convenient to achieve pseudo-parallelism by running each task 
as a separate job and letting the monitor's time-slicing provide the parallelism.
3.1.2. The Implementation
At the time of the last demonstration, communication between jobs 
was accomplished by a common data base located on a disk file. Since two 
FORTRAN jobs could not access this file without irrecoverable I/O errors, it 
was necessary to provide another job, MANAGER, and several more disk files, 
one for each job, such that access to the data base was controlled by MANAGER.
The continuous opening and closing of so many disk files caused the system to 
run extremely slowly and in addition, beat the disk around an unacceptable 
amount.
The system has been modified to use a new version of MANAGER. The 
new MANAGER, written in BLISS, makes use of new monitor feature to pass data 
through core from one job to another rather than through a disk file.
MANAGER keeps a copy of the master data base in its own user space.
Each job can pass messages to MANAGER requesting changes to the master data 
base, or requesting copies of any segment of that data base. The process is 
as follows:
First, the user job initializes itself by making a call to an 
assembly language subroutine which returns a unique identifier for the MANAGER
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and initially setting up a communication link to MANAGER. When the job wants 
to change something in the data base, it changes the first three words in a 
work area to codes which MANAGER will understand and translate into action.
It then copies the desired changes into the remaining words of the work area 
(the work area can be up to 512 words long). A call to another assembly 
language subroutine then creates a page in the user's address space, copies 
the work area into that page, and passes that page to MANAGER by Swapping 
page maps.
Reading from MANAGER is by a similar process. The user again s$ts 
up a work area, this time only three words long. He passes those three words 
to MANAGER using the same subroutine call, and then waits for a response and 
the new data base.
This mode of access to the global data base requires about 50 ms 
per transactions.
Communication between the PDP10 and PDP11 is currently accomplished 
via a FORTRAN program which reads the 2400 baud tty line between the two 
computers and communicates with MANAGER using page passing. The PDP-11 side 
is run using the stand-alone system developed at CSL.
3.1.3. Future Work
We will incorporate the Master Monitor Display (MMD) and the PDP-10 
to PDP-11 communications program (AFCOM) into MANAGER, since all three can 
conveniently be written in BLISS and by putting them into one program, we can 
cut down on the number of jobs which must communicate with manager using 
page passing, and consequently increase the speed.
We also plan to incorporate the PDP-11 side of the system into a
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job running under the M&M operating system which is currently under development 
and nearing usability.
3.2. The PDP-10 to PDP-11 Communication Link
In any multi-processor system the final performance and reliability 
of that system is dependent on the flexibility and integrity of the inter­
process communication links that can be established.
The Coordinated Science Laboratory CADM Project uses a system 
composed of two physical processors, a PDP-10 timeshared processor and a 
PDP-11 stand alone minicomputer. Several processes reside in the PDP-10.
They include the high level decision maker, demon, and processes that update 
simulation parameters. On the PDP-10 interprocess communication is controlled 
by a mangement process and makes use of the new inter-job communication 
facilities available in the 601 montior. The PDP-11 supports a single 
process. This process is the aircraft simulator and is responsible for 
maintaining the video display, the joystick input control, and the flight 
dynamics.
In this section of the report we will be concerned with hardware 
aspect of the inter-processor communication link between the PDP-11 and the 
PDP-10. We will also examine some of the low level software required to 
control the hardware.
This communication link consists of two parts. The first part 
is a 2400 baud full duplex teletype link between the two machines. The 
hardware required for this line consists of a DL-11 asynchronous line 
module that is connected to the PDP-11 unibus and a port out of the DC-10
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teletype controller already on the 1/0-bus of tho PDP-10. The PDP-10 thus 
"sees" the PDP-11 as an interactive user terminal, one of many already connected 
to the timesharing system. Similarly the PDP-11 "sees" the PDP-10 as an inter­
active terminal attached to its unibus. The second part of the communication 
link consists of a 7 megabaud communication channel, here after referred to 
as the channel, between the 1/0-bus on the PDP-10 and the unibus on the PDP-11. 
This channel will be used to send large blocks of data from one machine to the 
other.
The 2400 baud tty line, while it is considerably slower than the 
7 megabaud channel, plays a key role in maintaining the flexibility of the 
communication link between the two processors. The tty line allows a process 
on one machine to communicate with the monitor of the other machine, typically 
the process on the PDP-11 will give commands, or request information from the
601 monitor on the PDP-10. Thus a process on the PDP-11 can select, via the
monitor, which PDP-10 process it is going to communicate with, or more 
importantly, if that process does not exist, the PDP-11 process may create 
the process on the PDP-10 by issuing a "run" command to the 601 monitor.
The ability to run a job of the PDP-10 is a property of the tty lines and
could only be accomplished via the 7 megabaud channel only with considerable 
difficulty. It could be done with an extensive patch to the 601 monitor, 
which would increase its size appreciably, or by having a special process 
on the PDP-10 to cater to the channel. This extra process would take up 
space in the job tables. It would have to be functionally another copy of 
the tty handler in the 601 monitor. To sum things up, the 2400 baud tty line 
has two major functions. During the operation of bootstrapping the system 
together, the tty line has the power to easily spawn processes on the PDP-10 
side, if they do not already exist. It also has the power to destroy processes 
when they are no longer needed. The tty line is also instrumental in the
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allocation of the 7 megabaud channel to different processes on the PDP-10.
The 7 megabaud channel was built to provide the capability of moving 
large blocks of data from one machine to the other in a minimal amount of time. 
Under optimal conditions the speed with which the channel can move data from 
the core of one machine to the core of the other, is determined by the maximum 
rate that the PDP-10 processor can service requests on the I/O bus. This 
rate is 200,000 36-bit words per second. Thus it is possibly to perform an 
entire core load on the PDP-11 with its 120K of 16-bit words in .4 seconds 
using a format that generates 2 PDP-11 words from a single PDP-10 word.
The channel hardware physically consists of two racks of printed 
circuit cards, one mounted in each machine. The two racks are connected by 
40 coaxial lines, 16 for data, 16 for control, and 8 spare.
If a significant event occurs, the channel hardware informs each 
processor by setting the appropriate bit in their respective channel status 
words. If the appropriate interrupt enable bit is also set, which is the 
case for normal operation, then an interrupt will occur on that processor.
From now on we will assume that all the interrupt bits are set. The channel 
design philosophy emphasize seven major points: (1) to achieve high data 
transfer rates the channel makes use of the direct memory access "DMA" 
capabilities of both machines. On the PDP-11 side the channel hardware 
becomes master of the unibus and reads from, and writes to the memory, 
which is just another device on the unibus, without interrupting the program 
executing on the PDP-11 processor. Thus the program on the PDP-11 is slowed 
down only by the competition between the channel and the CPU for the unibus 
cycles. At worst this would slow the program down by about 307o, On the 
PDP-10 side the channel hardware makes use of the new KI-10 "data type"
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interrupts to force the PDP-10 processor to execute a partial I/O instruction 
to transfer a word of data between the channel on the I/O bus and the memory. 
This of course, transparent to the execution of PDP-10 programs, however it 
is also transparent to the monitor as well. In other words no monitor 
interrupt routine is required for this type of data transfer. One of the 
major advantages of using this new KI-10 interrupt is that data is loaded 
into mapped memory rather than into absolute memory addresses.
(2) For reliability, all data transmissions use full handshaking 
synchronization. If the PDP-11 is sending data to the PDP-10 for example, 
then the PDP-11 will not send another data word until the PDP-10 has read 
the first data word. In other words both machines can service the channel as 
slowly as they like without jeopardizing the reliability of the data. This 
synchronization is accomplished using two "done" bits, one for each machine. 
The exact sequence of events to transfer a data word from machine X to 
machine Y is as follows: 1) the done bit on machine X goes high, this causes 
a DMA interrupt, 2) a word is retrieved from the memory of machine X and 
placed in the channel, 3) machine Y receives the data word, 4) machine X 
clears its done bit and sets the done bit on machine Y. This causes an 
interrupt on machine Y, 5) Y now removes the data word from the channel and 
places it into its memory, 6) Y clears its done bit and sets the done bit 
on machine X, and the cycle repeats.
(3) The channel is a simplex bidirectional communication link.
Thus a data block can be transferred in only one direction at a time. The 
simplex implementation was chosen over a full duplex realization because 
it requires half the hardware. The problem of finding the direction of data
59
flow in the next communication is determined by the channel arbitration 
logic. Each processor may, by setting a bit, make a request to use the 
channel to write to the other machine. If both processors make such requests 
simultaneously then the use of the channel is granted by the arbitration logic 
to one processor or the other.
(4) All communication over the channel is done by mutual consent.
In other words both processors must agree by setting their respective "device 
active" bits to a data transfer before it can occur. It is impossible for 
one processor to force a data transfer upon the other via the channel hardware 
only. This feature protects the PDP-10 timesharing system from an erroneous 
or poorly debugged program on the PDP-11 causing a transfer that might corrupt 
the PDP-10's memory. Similarly it protects users on the PDP-11 from PDP-10 
users who might attempt to access the PDP-11 remotely without checking if this 
action might cause some conflict.
(5) Every attempt has been made to make each half of the channel 
operationally symmetric. Thus the same sequence of events that would invoke 
a read block operation on the PDP-11, for example, would perform similarly 
on the PDP-10, although the bits involved may be in different locations in 
the respective status words. This concept fits well with design philosophies 
3), 4). In addition, it makes the channel easier to program and easier to 
use since a description of how the channel words need only be given for the 
PDP-11 side, say, the operational description for the PDP-10 side being 
identical.
(6) Upon a request from the PDP-11, the channel also has the 
capability of bootstrapping the PDP-11 from the PDP-10. To make a bootstrap
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request the PDP-11 processor executes the fourth status word of the channel.
At this location is the instruction "CLR-(PC)n which when executed out of 
read only memory is a one instruction infinite loop. When the channel hard­
ware senses the execution of this instruction at this particular location the 
"PDP-11 bootstrap request" bit is set on the PDP-10 side. This causes an 
interrupt on the PDP-10 side. In addition, the PDP-11 side of the channel 
hardware is primed to receive an arbitrarily long block of data from the 
PDP-10 starting at memory location zero, and in a predefined format. After 
the PDP-10 has sent the bootstrap program to the PDP-11 the PDP-10 sets a 
write only bit on its side and the "CLR-(PC)" instruction, which the PDP-11 
has been executing repeatedly up till now, is changed by one bit to the 
instruction "CLR PC" which causes the location counter to jump to location 
zero and start execution of the newly loaded bootstrap program. Since only 
one bit is changed in the "CLR-(PC)" instruction it need not be synchronized 
to the execution cycle of the PDP-11 CPU. If 2 bits had to be changed, say 
from 00 to 11, then there would be the problem of the CPU executing the 
instruction at just the wrong instant, like when the bits were 01 or 10.
(7) The difference in word size, is perhaps the main obstacle 
in designing an efficient communication channel between the PDP-10 and the 
PDP-11. The PDP-11 has a 16-bit word while the PDP-10 has 36 bits per word.
In any ZZZZ processor communication link it is desirable for a processor to 
send and receive full words of data. Most programs normally expect data to 
come in full word chunks. Unfortunately, the first single bidirectional 
mapping that would pair full 16-bit words to full 36-bit words would map 
9 PDP-11 words to 4 PDP-10 words. Such a mapping is useless since considerable
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effort would be required to unpack the data bits into a useful form. For 
this reason it was necessary to use two bidirectional mapping schemes. This 
is accomplished by a section of the channel hardware called the mapping unit. 
In the first scheme (16-bit mode) full PDP-11 words are mapped to and from 
the low order 16 bits of the 2 halfwords of a single PDP-10 word. The first 
PDP-11 word is constructed out of the low order halfword, bits 20 through 35. 
The second PDP-11 word is constructed from bits 2 through 17. Bits 0,1,18,19 
of the PDP-10 word are normally thrown away, however they are available to 
unorthodox programs as the high order 4 bits of a third PDP-rll word. Thus 
using this first scheme the PDP-11 can send and receive full words of data. 
This mapping scheme is useful for transferring PDP-11 load modules and other 
"core image" data. It is used in all the low level software handshaking 
between the two machines, and in general is the best compromise in data 
formatting between the two processors.
In the second mapping scheme (12-bit mode) a full 36-bit PDP-10 
word is mapped to and from the low order 12 bits of 3 PDP-11 words. Bits 
15 through 12 of each PDP-11 word are discarded. Bits 0 through 11 of the 
first PDP-11 word are mapped to bits 35 through 24 of the PDP-10 word. The 
second PDP-11 word is mapped to bits 23 through 12, and the third is mapped 
to bits 11 through 0. Note that conventions for numbering the bits on the 
PDP-10 are opposite of those for the PDP-11. On a PDP-11 bit 15 is the most 
significant bit of a word, whereas on the PDP-10 bit 0 is most significant. 
This format was designed for the transfer of video display files, six bit 
ASCII, and "PDP-10 image" files that contain 36 bit words. 0n$ of the 
intentions here is to use the PIP program on the PDP-10 system without
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modification to transfer files to the PDP-11.
All of the mappings are bidirectional. Thus while bits must be 
thrown away when the data is compressed, I.E, 16-bit mode PDP-10 to PDP-11, 
something must be done to fill these bits when the data expands, I.E. 16-bit 
mode PDP-11 to PDP-10. There are three possibilities, all of which are 
provided by the channel hardware. The extra bits can be filled with zeros, 
ones, or the sign can be extended.
The mapping unit can also throw words away. It is possible, for 
example, in the 12-bit mode to construct only two PDP-11 words out of one 
PDP-10 word. This would be done by skipping the third PDP-11 word. Similarly 
for one word to one word mapping in both modes.
Whenever a communication link maps one word of data on machine X 
to multiple words of data on machine Y, a boundary problem exists. If a data 
word is automatically read from the memory of machine X, expanded, and loaded 
into K consecutive memory locations in machine Y, by the hardware of the 
communication link, then it would be impossible fro machine Y to have 
buffers of size N filled exactly with data unless N is an integer multiple 
of K. Using the 12-bit mode K = 3 and N * 256, which is standard for DEC's 
DOS (Disc Operating System) it would be impossible to completely fill the 
buffer. The buffer would have to be filled either one short of two words 
over. Both of these alternatives are unacceptable. In order to avoid this 
problem the communication channel has two internal conditions bits that 
indicate how many PDP-11 words will be formed out of the first PDP-10 word.
In the above example, the initial condition bits would be set up so that one 
PDP-11 word would be constructed out of the first PDP-10 word. This is done
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by throwing away first two out of three PDP-11 words and the remaining 85 
PDP-10 words would each form three PDP-11 words, to fill exactly, the 256 
word buffer.
These two bits along with the mode bit define the state of the 
mapping unit. Since these bits are not affected by an interrupt caused by 
the channel hardware, it is possible, when one machine receives a "buffer 
full" interrupt to redirect the channel hardware t;o continue to load data at 
a different core location even though other machine has not finished with 
its buffer. Thus the PDP-11, as well as the PDP-10, can switch data buffers 
in the middle of a data transfer transparently to the other side without loss 
of continuity.
The channel hardware has the capability of accessing in sequentially 
increasing or sequentially decreasing order, the memory of each machine. Not 
only does this allow for the reformatting of data in an array, but in fact, 
one of the more useful modes is to access the memory of both machines back­
wards. This is the only way that 12-bit data in a form amenable to the PDP-10 
byte instructions can be transferred to the PDP-11 in sequentially ascending 
memory address locations. This being a useful format for data processing 
on the PDP-11.
A word should be said about the software concerned with the operation 
of the communication channel. After being assigned the use of the channel 
by their respective monitors, programs on the PDP-10 and PDP-11 may communicate 
in one of three ways. 1) The PDP-10 program will issue write block command 
and the PDP-11 program will reciprocate by issuing a read block command.
2) Reversing the roles, the PDP-11 program will issue the write block command
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and the PDP-10 program will reciprocate. 3) They may both issue read and 
write block commands. The read and write block commands are received by 
their respective monitors and passed to a software package within the monitor 
called the channel driver. The channel driver is responsible for establishing 
communication with a similar package on the other side, and executing the 
low level dialog with the other driver before the actual data can be sent.
The driver must also be prepared to handle any error conditions that might 
arise. The PDP-10 driver may also provide the bootstrapping service for the 
PDP-11.
A driver will typically attempt to establish communications with 
the other driver, the first time it is called by the monitor. To establish 
communications the driver must pet a "device active" bit. Only after both 
"device active" bits are set will the channel become active. This event is 
indicated in the channel status words of each machine, and can cause respective 
interrupts if the appropriate interrupt enable bit is set. Since the channel 
is simplex only one driver can talk at a time, the other must listen. Due 
to the symmetry of the implementation, both drivers will typically want to 
talk at the same time. This conflict is resolved by the channel arbitration 
logic. Each driver must place a "request to transmit" command to the channel 
arbitration logic. If the other driver has not made a similar request then 
the first driver is granted the right to use the simplex channel to transmit 
information to the other driver. If both drivers make the request simul­
taneously then the transmit rights are given to one driver or the other and 
not both. The decision of the arbitration is indicated by bits in the 
channel status words, and a respective transmit and receive interrupts are
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caused. After a driver is finished transmitting it clears its "request to 
transmit" bit and waits for a reply.
These short transmission typically one or two PDP-10 words volley 
back and forth until the two drivers decide, which direction the data blocks 
will go first, what format the data will be in i.e. 16 or 12 bit mode, and 
the number of data words in the block. After the arbitration logic grants 
the use of the channel to the transmitter of the data block, each side receives 
the appropriate transmit/receive interrupt. At this point rather than sending 
over one or two words explicitly, each side loads an address and word count 
register and sets a DMA enable bit. When both DMA enable bits are set, the 
data block is transferred automatically form one machine to the other without 
further intervention by the software. As each data word is read/written to 
the memory of each machine the respective word count and address registers 
are incremented/decremented. It should be noted that the address and word 
count refer to the words on that machine. Thus if the mapping is set up 
such that one PDP-10 word is mapped to three PDP-11 words then for each time 
the PDP-10 word count register is incremented the PDP-11 word count register 
will be incremented by three. The DMA transfer is stopped when either of 
the word count registers equal zero. Normally they will both hit zero at the 
same time. If not the machine with the word count equal to zero can reset 
the word count and the data transfer will continue without loss of continuity. 
After the machine transmitting the data block is finished, it releases its 
transmitting rights thus interrupting the other side, and this event is 
used to indicate that the transfer is complete. It should be noted that 
normally both of these interrupts occur at the same time. If something
v
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has gone wrong, however, they will not be coincident. To conclude the 
transaction the data receiver will return another short message indicating 
to the data transmitter that all the data was received correctly.
Before the driver returns to the monitor for the last time it should 
clear its "device active" bit and thus indicate to the other driver that it 
may no longer exist in core. The "device active" bits are cleared by a 
"reset" instruction on both machines, or by power up conditions. In general, 
nothing can happen unless both "device active" bits are set.
The process of bootstrapping the PDP-11 is identical to the descrip­
tion for loading a data block, except that everything is done automatically 
by the channel hardware on the PDP-11 side rather than by software. Unlike 
the software the hardware is incapable of handling error conditions that may 
occur during the bootstrapping operation. If the PDP-11 is bootstrapped in 
this manner, it is the only time that the PDP-11 is at the mercy of the PDP-10. 
At any other time, if sufficiently comprehensive error handling routines exist 
in the PDP-11 channel driving software, it is impossible for the PDP-10 to 
take over control of the PDP-11. Of course if the PDP-11 software is coopera­
tive then anything is possible. It is this property, that the PDP-11 is a 
slave only when it wants to be, that forbids there being multiple possibly 
incompatible masters for one slave. The result in such a case is chaos.
Both the PDP-11 and the PDP-10 are capable of supporting their 
own monitors and operating independently of each other. The communication 
channel was designed to maintain this property and thus it is impossible to 
"take over control" of one processor from the other via the channel hardware 
only. The major part of this security is provided by the fact that each
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the DMA transfer of data on its side. The other aspect of security, is that 
the channel hardware prevents one processor from "hanging" the other. In 
other words it is impossible for one processor to prevent the other from 
doing any useful work. This type of interference can take on several forms.
If during a data transfer either side hangs up the hook by clearing the "device 
active" bit or by releasing transmission privileges then the other side is 
informed of this event with an interrupt and the appropriate status bit set. 
Basically if any change occurs in the state of the channel hardware then, 
if it is appropriate to do so, the other side is informed with an interrupt 
and a bit set in one of the status words indicating what condition caused 
the interrupt. If for some reason one side has gone into an infinite loop 
and is continually causing interrupts, faster than the other side can service 
them (an interrupt is serviced when tthe bit indicating the interrupt type 
in the status word is cleared) then a loss of information interrupt occurs.
At this point the appropriate thing for the processor to do is to completely 
recycle the channel hardware as though it had just been started up. Each 
side of the channel has one DMA enable bit and two interrupt enable bits.
The first enables the word count equals zero condition. The other enables 
all of the change of state interrupts. A change of state interrupt occurs 
whenever a significant change occurs in the state of the channel hardware 
i.e. when the channel becomes active for one side or the other gains transmit 
privileges or the other side becomes inactive, or a loss of information 
occurs. The explicit state of the channel can also be read by both side. 
However, this information is less important.
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In conclusion, it is perhaps only fair to note that the construction 
of the communication channel has not been without its growing pains. Most 
note worthy of these is the original design of the high speed coax transmitter/ 
receiver cards, which developed internal oscillations, probably due to 
capacitive cross coupling between circuits. It is now recognized that the 
channel hardware was overdesigned in several respects, most notably speed.
It turns out that almost all the programs that use the channel are computaton 
bound. Due to the care in documentation taken during the design stage the 
debugging of the channel has been reasonably straight forward. The channel 
has now been in limited operation for the last two months now, quite to the 
satisfaction of those users concerned.
3.3. PDP-11 System Software
3.3.1. Introduction
To aid in software development and provide ease of operation the 
M and M system has been written. This monitor while being specifically 
designed for the PDP-11 system at CSL has many features that could possibly 
recommend it to a wider user group. A general description of the system's 
facilities will follow.
The M and M system is designed to run on a PDP-11/40 with memory 
management option, a system console, a booting device (preferably dectape or 
disk), and at least 48K of main memory. The system itself in the current 
configuration requires 28K and part of a 4K buffer area (the rest will be
o
used for user request ED buffers).
3.3.2. 124K Memory Utilization
The M and M (Much Memory) system has been designed primarily to
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make use of a hardware system with much more memory than is easily accessed 
by a single user partition. Whenever possible system data structures have 
been built in memory partitions that differ for the user's (either in the 
kernal memory space or in transient pages). Also several monitor calls 
have been provided to allow user controlled access of extended memory 
(memory beyond the user's 32K address space).
At this point it would be profitable to briefly discuss the 
PDP-11 paging hardware so that the methods employed in system paging will 
be more clearly understood.
The PDP-11/40 memory management option consists of 16 page 
descriptor registers (PDRS), 16 page address registers (PARS), and 2 status 
registers (SSRO and SSR2). Of the 16 PDRS 8 are used for user addressing 
(UPD0-UPD7) and 8 are for kernels addressing (XPD0-XP07). Similarly 8 of 
the PARS are for user space (UPA0-UPA7) and 8 are for kernel space (XPAO- 
XPA7).
The user or kernel addressing spaces are divided into 8 4K word 
segments. Each of these is described by a PAR-PDR pair. The first 4K 
(addresses 000000-017777) is referred to by PARO-PDRO. The next (020000- 
037777) by PAR1-PDR1 and so on.
When a virtual address (16-bit) is generated by effective address 
calculation, the top 3 bits are used to access one of the 8 PAR-PDR pairs in 
the user or kernel maps. The PDR tells the length of the page allocated in 
that 4K block of addresses, the segment access code, and the direction of 
expansion. This information is used to determine if the effective address 
is obtainable. If not a page fault trap occurs with information concerning
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the fault returned in SSRO and SSR2. The PAR is used if the page is properly 
accessed as a base for calculation of an 18-bit unibus address. The low order 
6 bits of the effective address are sent straight through to the unibus address 
lines thus selecting a byte or word in a 32 word block. The next 7 bits are 
added to the selected PAR to obtain the high 12 bits of the unibus address.
The processor status (PS) is used to select the proper page map 
set to use in memory addressing. If the high order 2 bits (bits 15-14) are 
11 the user maps are used for all instructions excrpt MTPI and MFPI (move 
to/from previous instruction space). If they are 00 the kernel maps are 
used. MTPI and MFPI are used to access core locations in the address space 
where traps originated from. As such these instructions fetch all address 
operands from the address space selected by the high order 2 bits of the 
PS and fetch (or write) data operands from (to) the address space selected 
by bits 13-12 of the PS (00=kernel, ll=user). These bits are set by each 
interrupt transaction so in the case of the various trap instructions (EMT, 
trap, IOT, BPT) The address space from which the trap was fetched is set.
To change the user addressing space totally (as done during a 
time slice) all user PARS and PDRS must be saved in a control block and 
replaced with new values using the move instruction.
The M and M system uses the paging hardware in 3 basic ways. First, 
much of the monitor itself is not always paged. Different system modules are 
paged into core by request through user issued monitor calls (EMT instructions). 
Second, a set of monitor calls are provided to allow user tasks to request 
particular 4K segments to be mapped by name or by segment number (0-31), 
31=device register addresses.- The M and M system allocates all core using
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4K multiples for ease in use of the memory mangement hardware. Third, 
users may elect to write applications that contain several concurrently 
running processes. Each process may be allocated independent or overlapping 
core segments (and therefore address spaces).
3.3.3. Input/Output Modularity and Debugging
There are two major categories of input/output equipment attached 
to the PDP-11 hardware system. These are the tty-like devices and the "DMA"- 
like devices. "DMA" is used to indicate non-tty rather than actual DMA(direct 
memory access). All DMA devices are also "DMA" and for software purposes 
both are the same (in that they both require driver modules). DMA will be 
used to refer to both from now forward.
All tty-like devices are serviced through a re-entrant handler 
embedded in the system file-structure programs. The DMA-like devices each 
are serviced by independent device driver programs. The driver provides 
the software interface from the device hardware to the DMA device independent 
file handlers. To extend monitor I/O service to new classes of devices 
(currently RK11 disks, CSL communications channel, and dectape are supported), 
new device drivers need only be written.
The system file structure programs provide device independence 
for sequential input/output among all devices (tty-like and DMA). Only 
DMA devices may support direct access and multiple channel I/O (more than 
one input and output channel open at once). Sequential files use monitor 
controlled buffer areas created in extended memory and accessed on input/ 
output calls using an external page (a page reserved in the kernel address 
space for various operations in extended core).
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A debugging package is provided for system and user task debugging. 
This set of routines provides trace back information after failures, trace 
and breakpoint facilities, core manipulation facilities, and system status 
checking. All operations of the debugging modules are designed for minimum 
interaction with the routines being debugged.
All communications to the system is accomplished by the EMT trap 
instruction. This instruction causes an interrupt sequence which enters 
the system EMT handler. From there the appropriate system module is paged 
into addressable memory and transferred to. On return the system maps are 
restored.
3.3.4. Medium Zero Program
This system program is used to initialize direct access media for 
M and M system file structured input/output. The initialization parameters 
are obtained from the appropriate device block in the monitor (using the 
device characteristics EMT).
For directory structured devices this program performs a bad 
block analysis and then writes a medium directory with bad blocks flagged.
3.3.5. Multitasking and Real Time Trapping
One user address space is initialized at monitor start up time.
This space is used to run the first (root) user task. This task can then 
start other tasks and start system time slicing.
The algorithm used to choose the next task when context switching 
is quite simple. Any task not in wait state flagged active is a candidate. 
The one actually chosen will be the one having the highest run priority 
(set at task start time). If several tasks have the same priority a
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round robin scheme is used to choose the next to run. That is, the same 
task will not run twice in a row.
Context swapping consists of changing user maps, user registers, 
user information in the kernel (such as project-programmer number, map saves, 
etc.), and kernel stacks. Each user task is allocated a job table entry for 
holding the various task specific information and a system stack. During 
an entire user's time slice his system stack is used for all transactions 
(including interrupts).
Timesharing (context swapping) may voluntarily be turned off by 
any user task (thereby freezing that task in the user maps). Also on any 
fault condition timesharing is frozen. If the fault may be recovered by 
the operator and the system is continued timesharing is also continued. If 
the fault is terminal the system will have to be reinitialized following any 
debugging interogation by the operator.
User tasks may request that segments be mapped into kernel 
address space for extremely fast interrupt processing. If slower speed 
response is tolerable the user may set up an interrupt routine in his own 
area. On interrupt (or timer calls) the user's routine will be paged into 
the user address space and transferred to. This allows highly flexible 
real-time interrupt processing in any user task.
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3.4. Flight Equations
The following is a presentation of the equations used in the aero­
dynamic simulation. An explanation of the terms involved follows the pre­
sentation. The order of presentation is not necessarily the correct order 
for programming the equations.
1. LIFT COEFFICIENT:
CL=CLA*ALPH+CLDE*DELE+CLAD*ALDOT+CLQ*(Q*CBAR)1(2.0*V)-CLO
2. DRAG COEFFICIENT:
CD=CDO+(CL*CL)/(PI*EO*AR)+CDDE*DELE
3. LONGITUDINAL FORCE COEFFICIENT:
CX =CL*SALPH-CD*CALPH
4. VERTICAL FORCE COEFFICIENT:
CZ=-CL*CALPH-CD*SALPH
5. PITCHING MOMENT COEFFICIENT:
CM=€MO+CMA*ALPH+CMDE*DELE+CMQ*Q*CBAR/
(2.0*V)+CL*(CG -CGREF) +CMAD*ALDOT
6. ROLLING MOMENT COEFFICIENT:
CSL=CSLDA*DELA+CSLP*P*B/(2.0*V)
7. AERODYNAMIC FORCES AND MOMENTS
( L=ROLLING MOMENT, M=PITCHING MOMENT):
XAERO=CX*QI*S
ZAERO=CZ*QI*S
LAERO=CSL*QI*S*B
MAERO=CM*QI*S*B
ACCELERATION:
8. ALONG X AXIS:
UDOT=W*Qf(XAERO+XTRST)/MASS-GZ*(-STHET)
9. ALONG Z AXIS:
WDOT=U*Q+ZAERO/MASS-GZ*CPHI*CTHET
10 OF PITCH RATE: 
THDOT=Q*CPHI
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11. OF ROLL RATE:
PHDOT=P
The aircraft rates are integrals of the above accelerations with the 
following additions.
1. ROLLING RATE:
PD0T=LAER0/M0INX
2. PITCHING RATE:
0D0T=MAER0/M0INY
The pitching and rolling moments are the integrals of the above rates. 
This incomplete treatment of the equations of flight is rounded out with the 
fo1lowing equations•
1. AIRCRAFT VELOCITY:
V=SQRT(U*U+W*W)
2. RATE OF CLIMB:
R0C=W
The altitude is a function of some initial altitude and the integral 
of the rate of climb. The heading is a function of roll angle.
EXPLANATION OF TERMS:
1. CIA LIFT CURVE SLOPE PER RADIAN
2. ALPH ANGLE OF ATTACK RADIAN
3. CLDE ELEVATOR LIFT CURVE SLOPE PER RADIAN
4. DELE ELEVATOR DEFLECTION RADIANS
5. ALDOT ANGLE OF ATTACK RATE RAD/SEC
6 CLAD ANGLE OF ATTACK RATE LIFT CURVE SLOPE PER RADIAN
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7. CSLQ PITCHING MOMENT PITCH RATE DERIVATIVE PER RADIAN
8. Q ANGULAR RATE ABOUT THE Y AXIS RAD/SEC
9. CBAR MEAN AERODYNAMIC CHORD FEET
10. CLO LIFT COEFFICIENT AT NO ELEVATOR 
DEFLECTION —
11. CDO MINIMUM DRAG COEFFICIENT —
12. CD I INDUCED DRAG COEFFICIENT —
13. CDDE ELEVATOR DEFLECTION DRAG PER RADIAN
14. CMA PITCHING MOMENT COEFFICIENT SLOPE PER RADIAN
15. CMQ PITCHING MOMENT RATE DERIVATIVE PER RADIAN
16. CMO PITCHING MOMENT COEFFICIENT AT 
ZERO LIFT —
17. CMDE ELEVATOR DEFLECTION PITCHING MOMENT
COEFFICIENT PER RADIAN
18. CMAD ANGLE OF ATTACK RATE PITCHING MOMENT 
DERIVATIVE PER RADIAN
19. CG CENTER OF GRAVITY:LOCATION % CHORD
20. CGREF AERO DATA REFERENCE % CHORD
21. CSLDA AILERON DEFLECTION ROLLING MOMENT 
DERIVATIVE PER RADIAN
22. DELA AILERON DEFLECTION RADIANS
23. CSLP ROLLING MOMENT ROLL RATE DERIVATIVE PER RADIAN
24. P ANGULAR RATE ABOUT THE X AXIS RAD/SEC
25. B WING SPAN FEET
26. XTRSTL THRUST,LEFT ENGINE POUNDS,FORCE
27. XTRSTR THRUST,RIGHT ENGINE POUNDS,FORCE
28. MASS AIRCRAFT MASS SLUGS
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29. XTRST TOTAL THRUST, BOTH ENGINES POUNDS,FORCE
30. QI DYNAMIC PRESSURE POUNDS PER
SQUARE FOOT
31. S WING AREA SQUARE FEET
32. GZ ACCELERATION OF GRAVITY FEET/SEC/SEC
33. W VELOCITY ALONG Z AXIS FEET/SEC
34. u VELOCITY ALONG X AXIS FEET/SEC
35. PHI BANK ANGLE RADIANS
36. MOINX MOMENT OF INERTIA ABOUT X AXIS SLUG-SQUARE FEET
37. MOINY MOMENT OF INERTIA ABOUT Y AXIS SLUG-SQUARE FEET
38. THETA PITCH ANGLE RADIANS
39. ()DOT DERIVATIVE OF () —
40. C( ) COSINE OF () —
41. S( ) SINE OF () —
42. SQRT SQUARE ROOT —
43. AR ASPECT RATIO —
44. EO OSWALD'S EFFICIENCY FACTOR
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4. ADVANCED CONCEPTS
4.1. Planning and Execution in Incompletely Specified Environments 
4.1.1. Introduction
In conventional computer applications, data is input and manip- 
lated according to predefined plans specified by the programmer. Programs 
are written to provide solutions to problems for which algorithms are 
known. While the numerical data may be changed easily, altering the goal 
of the program may require extensive modification. This type of approach 
may be unacceptable in systems where the exact problem specification 
is not known at the time of programming.
In order to create programs which can solve a wider variety 
of problems, much time has been spent constructing systems which attempt 
to make the computer "understand" the subjects with which it is dealing. 
Many of the systems are planners, i.e., programs which take a goal as an 
input and generate a plan which can be executed, at which time the given 
task will have been satisfied.
Most of the existing high level planners such as STRIPS[4] and 
PLANNER[6,14] will report a success only when a detailed plan has been 
developed. These planners have primarily been applied to simple domains 
in which all relevant aspects concerning the state of the world are 
known to the planner. In these domains, nothing can change without the 
execution of a system initiated action.
Many of the planning systems are based upon the idea that a 
problem may be divided into a series of subgoals (or preconditions).
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Any one of a number of techniques or operators can be employed in order to 
try to satisfy the subgoal. A sequence of correct operators would determine 
the solution. However, much of the deduction may depend upon the presence 
of certain data in the database. If this data were not known at the time 
of planning, then an entire section could fail. In many cases information 
may be missing because of incomplete modeling of the world due to the domains 
complexity. But in other cases, the overall concept may have been modeled, 
but the specific piece of datum may not be "known" to the planner, much as 
a person may not know what is going on in the next room.
In order to increase the complexity of the problems and domains that 
can be accommodated, it is necessary to extend the capabilities of the deduc­
tion languages and systems in the following areas:
The deduction mechanism must have the capability to construct plans 
in a dynamic environment. By dynamic, it is meant that movements of objects 
or changes in the world can occur without being merely consequences of system 
actions. In this type of situation, it may be futile to formulate a detailed 
plan based upon specific data when a dynamic alteration of this data may totally 
invalidate the remainder of the plan. Planning for all of the possible 
alternatives would, in most cases, be unfeasible due to the large number 
of future states possible. One alternative would be to have a planner 
which would "know" that it exists in the real world. The planner would 
have the ability to vary the complexity of the plans generated according to 
the situation. This would lead to a case where there would be no necessary 
distinction between the planning and execution phases. In certain 
cases, the plans which would be generated would be of a more
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general nature, reflecting an outline of the important steps and tasks to 
be done. As the execution progresses, new information would be received 
and added to the database. This would allow more details of the plan to 
be computed as execution continued.
A deductive mechanism should be able to operate in an environment 
in which there is a lack of information. This would correspond to the 
real world situation where a human being has to make an intelligent 
evaluation when some of the facts are missing. This capability has to 
be attained before the dynamic planning and execution can occur. This is 
because while it may be recognized that a certain aspect of the world may 
be expected to exhibit dynamic action, it may not be known what the value 
would be when needed. Planning may have to continue without the definite 
information. The planner must have the ability to gather new information. 
Among the possible ways in which this could be accomplished are: have the
system develop a question or allow the mechanism to seek out information 
by inspecting the environment using any sensory equipment available.
If it is realized that while certain possibly relevant information is not 
known during the periods of initial planning, it may be possible to plan if it. 
is realized that the information is to become available at some future time.
In this case, it may be necessary to analyze certain possible future states 
of the world. For this, there must be a mechanism for storing global 
knowledge and models concerning this unknown information. It may also be 
desirable to incorporate probabilities and costs into the deductive and 
decision making procedures.
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4.1.2. Related Research
Research concerning the application of general deduction 
mechanisms to real world problems which are dynamic in nature and/or are 
incompletely specified have been extremely limited. It appears that 
many of the existing systems are incapable of being extended to handle 
these types of problems without extensive modifications.
PLANNER[6,14] allows strategies and relationships to be expressed 
as procedures called theorems. These theorems are executed in order 
to try to satisfy the problem which consists of a series of goals.
The control stucture is based upon a depth first search or backtracking.
It appears that it would be difficult to express the idea that certain 
facts may not be known at a given time. PLANNER understands only one type 
of failure, that being when a goal cannot be satisfied. If, however, 
a goal is not satisfied not because it is "wrong" but because some of the 
necessary data are missing, then a different type of failure has occurred, 
a type which PLANNER cannot understand. When dealing with this "unspecified 
information", it is necessary to maintain several alternatives from which 
one may be chosen. Storing this type of information is very difficult 
in PLANNER.
When evaluating a theorem, PLANNER treats each of its steps or 
subgoals as equal. During the planning, all of these subgoals are of equal 
importance. If one fails, the theorem fails. But, it appears that in 
reality, subgoals have different levels of importance. This means that 
more time should be spent in order to satisfy a key subgoal than a relatively 
minor one. PLANNER'S depth first control structure would not allow the
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consideration of all major subgoals first.
Many of the philosophies in PLANNER are also contained in QA4[10]. 
The context mechanism which is available in QA4 would allow the storage 
of alternative plans resulting from different possible values of unspecified 
information. QA4's limited effectiveness, as with PLANNER, arises from 
the backtracking philosophy which is embedded in both the systems. The 
introduction of new types of failures makes backtracking an undesirable 
search technique. As in PLANNER, the inflexibility of the recommendation 
lists means that once a sequence of theorems is formed, it cannot be 
altered or edited. This appears to be inappropriate when desiring to alter 
control as new information is determined.
C0NN1VER's[7,13] main advantages over PLANNER and QA4 are freedom 
from compulsory backtracking, the inclusion of a context mechanism, and 
flexible possibilities lists. The possibilities list, which specifies 
the next procedure to be tried, can be inspected or edited at any time.
The control structure is based upon the frame concept[1] which allows a 
total deduction environment to be maintained and continued. This allows 
great flexibility in specifying how a theorem is to be evaluated. Despite 
its advantages, it appears that C0NN1VER has not yet been applied in 
systems which require the integration of planning and execution, such as 
those dealing with dynamic situations in uncertain environments.
Much of the work which has been done concerning the problems 
found in executing and planning have been outgrowths and extensions of the 
STRIPS[2,3,4,5] system. STRIPS is used to generate a plan which could be 
solved through the application of a sequence of operators. An operator can
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be executed when all of its preconditions have been satisfied. The PLANNEX[6] 
system takes a complete STRIPS plan and monitors its execution. Using this 
system, actions may be deleted from the plan if it is determined that their 
consequences are not needed. It can also recognize if necessary initial 
conditions are absent, which would lead to a replan mode. It is also possible 
to take solutions which have been generated and generalize them. These 
MACR0PS[5] are saved and can be used to satisfy future tasks or subtasks. 
STRIPS only succeeds when a complete plan has been generated. The presence of 
unspecified information would in most cases lead to a failure. STRIPS would 
respond to this type of failure by searching for an alternate plan.
Recent results have demonstrated that STRIPS-like systems can be 
made more efficient by employing a hierarchical approach[9,11,12]. These 
systems have been constructed using the principle that preconditions of an 
operator are of varying importance and some should be examined and satisfied 
before others. By trying to satisfy the preconditions which are most basic 
or are harder to achieve first, irrelevant operators can be eliminated sooner. 
The preconditions are assigned a criticality or rank. The higher valued pre­
conditions represent the tasks which must be satisfied first. So in 
ABSTRIPS[11], which plans in a robot and block domain the precondition that an 
object be a block has a higher rank than the precondition that the block is in 
a room. Both have a higher rank than a precondition which demands that a 
robot or manipulator is also in the room. When a problem specification is 
received, the criticality is set to a maximum value (which would contain all 
predicates representing unchangable information). Preconditions with criti­
cality below this value are initially ignored. A plan is constructed using 
whatever techniques are appropriate to the system and domain. The plans
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produced will satisfy all of the final conditions, but the operators specified 
will only be satisfied through their most critical preconditions. As the 
criticality is lowered, new preconditions are introduced for the already 
specified operators. As these preconditions are satisfied, new operators are 
introduced forming a more detailed plan. When the criticality has been set 
to its lowest value and all preconditions have been satisfied, a complete, 
detailed plan will have been constructed. While this type of planning has 
proven to be more efficient that STRIPS, of more interest are the types of 
plans which are generated. Some of the high-criticality plans have many of the 
desired attributes of a partial plan outline. The plans do not contain every 
necessary detail, but rather only the major steps which must occur. These 
approaches have not been used to satisfy problems in domains which are dynamic 
or incompletely specified. In [8] Minsky describes a framework for a represen­
tation of knowledge which would permit the inclusion of situation dependent 
default values. The scope of the world model which is considered at any 
time is a function of the present environment.
4.1.3. Planning in an Incompletely Specified 
and/or Dynamic Domain
Systems which are to operate in an incompletely specified, real world 
environment must of necessity operate differently than the existing planners. 
There must be a realization that knowledge concerning some of the relevant 
portions of the world may be unavailable during some of the stages of planning. 
This may be because the unknown portion of the world is outside of the system's 
monitoring capability and/or may be changing as time progresses. Because of 
this, the planner must realize that in many cases it is not feasible, if not 
futile, to insist upon construction of a completely detailed plan before the 
initiation of execution. The system must have the knowledge that missing
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information may be obtained in various ways, such as through observation 
or questioning. The system may have to plan around some of the missing 
information by making reasonable assumptions.
When a problem is specified to a planning or execution system, 
it may be done in several ways. The most common method is to specify 
aspects of the world which must exist after the plan has been executed.
This is generally accomplished by specifying a goal state. It may also 
be desirable to specify possible intermediate states which may have to be 
satisfied in a certain order. Most of the existing planners place little 
emphasis on how the goal state is to be achieved. There is little or no 
concern about whether the plan which has been generated is optimal or 
near-optimal according to any criteria. However, in more realistic 
situations, people strive for a more efficient plan even though their 
analysis may not include a formal statement of what is best. A planner 
should also be able to accept a statement of what criteria should be used.
In these types of problem specifications, there are really only 
three general methods which can be used to insure that a portion of the 
goal is satisfied. First, the goal could already be true in the world 
and represented in the system's world model. Second, the goal could be 
true in the world model but not explicitly represented in the system's 
model and it could be deduced that the goal is a logical consequence of 
available information in the model. Third, it may be that the goal is not 
true in either the model or the world but it is possible to perform actions 
which will alter the world in such a manner that the goal will be satisfied. 
The existing general purpose planners satisfy goals using these general
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techniques.
But all of the situations above are predicated on the concept 
that all relevant information is directly known or could be deduced. But 
these are clearly not realistic assumptions. The world model which the 
system maintains could be deficient in many ways. Some information 
could be missing due to the necessary simplifications which must occur 
when modeling a complicated domain. However, if some aspect of the world 
were expected to be important for planning, it would surely be represented. 
And some of the information could be missing because it is just not 
known, no matter how relevant it may be. The latter case is of major 
interest because this type of unspecification occurs in realistic problems 
when a portion of the world is beyond monitoring capability or when dynamic 
situations alter previously known values.
One major problem is how to recognize this type of missing 
information, which will be referred to as "unknown" information. When 
a precondition to an operator is encountered, it is imperative to know 
whether it belongs to a previously mentioned category or is unknown 
information. No matter how complete the model, certain information may 
be absent if the system is solely responsible for collecting and storing 
the information. But by using semantic knowledge about the world, it may 
be possible to determine something about how to satisfy the preconditions. 
The initial attempt to satisfy a precondition involves examining the 
database in order to see if the precondition is satisfied because it is 
already true. As soon as it is determined that the needed fact is not in 
the database, the system checks to determine if the concept is unspecified.
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In many cases it is possible to determine that a precondition is not 
satisfied by inspecting the database for contradictory information. If this 
is the case, then the system can conclude that the information is specified 
and that some action is needed. Sometimes, however, sufficient information 
is not available to make the determination and the system may have to 
postpone the decision. Initially, research concerning unknown information 
will be confined to predicates whose restrictions are limited. In these 
cases the alternate values and contradictions can be expressed in a fairly 
straightforward manner.
When the database is being referenced, it is not enough to find 
a specific fact represented. The dynamic properties of the domain have 
to be considered. Some of the attributes may change dynamically in a 
random or predetermined manner. This would affect the confidence in the 
truth or falsity of a fact.
In order to ascertain the value for an item of unknown information, 
it is necessary to activate some type of input. This may include any sensory 
device available, such as a camera for observation. It may also take the 
form of a response to a question. In any case, the system must know the 
appropriate methods available. It must also be aware of when types of 
information can be obtained.
As has been stated, a planned solution to a task is a sequence 
of actions whose execution would alter the world from an initial state 
to a goal state. The proper actions are determined by evaluating operators. 
The form of the operators is shown in Figure 12. The operators represent 
allowable actions in a domain. They are STRIPS-like in representation but
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(TO task
(ACTION action)
(PRECONDITIONS
(critica litypl (conditionl)) 
(critica lityp2 (condition2))
(criticalitypn (conditionn))) 
(DELETION
(criticalitydl (deletionl)) 
(criticalityd2 (deletion2))
(criticalitydi (deletioni))) 
(ADDITION
(criticalityal (additionl)) 
(critica litya2 (addition2))
(criticalityaj (additionj)))
Figure 12
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have direct counterparts in PLANNER and CONNIVER. Each operator has a set 
of preconditions which must be satisfied before the action can be executed 
(either real-time or during planning). The operators have ADDITION and 
DELETION lists. These represent the aspects of the world which are 
expected to be altered when the action is executed. These are only used 
to update the system's world model. The system is responsible for making 
any observations necessary to insure that the changes in the world correspond 
to the expected changes.
Each of the preconditions, additions and deletions has a number 
associated with it. This is the criticality of a predicate. There is 
an upper limit for the criticality in a domain. This is for concepts which 
cannot be altered by any system action. The concepts represented by 
predicates with lower criticalities can be changed. The criticalities 
roughly represent the order in which the preconditions must be satisfied.
If there are two preconditions with different criticalities, the one with the 
highest criticality is satisfied first; the lower precondition will be 
satisfiable in some manner.
So, when considering an operator, the criticality is set to some 
value. Any precondition with criticality below this is not considered 
at that time. If all of the pertinent preconditions have been satisfied 
when the criticality is 'n', it is said that the operator is satisfied 
through criticality n. If all of the operators in a plan are satisfied 
through criticality 1, the a complete, detailed plan should have been 
generated.
A significant research area concerns how to satisfy the prerequisites 
and the development of a control structure which would facilitate the
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efficient construction of intelligent plans. The conventional methods 
for satisfying the prerequisites have been described above. Research is 
being conducted concerning the possibility of considering a prerequisite 
to be satisfied by "assumption" at certain levels of criticality and 
stages of planning. In these cases, a precondition may be assumed to be 
satisfied (or satisfiable) at an early planning stage. The system must 
be aware of the assumptions being made and have reasons for these actions.
To date, several classes of assumptions and their reasons have been 
formulated. The most basic is a low-criticality precondition. In most 
cases it is possible to assume that a precondition with a criticality 
below some cutoff can be satisfied. This is because this type of pre­
condition was to be constructed as an easily done detail. The criticality 
cutoff could be determined by the stage of planning, the domain used as 
well as the system’s knowledge of what tasks could always be accomplished.
Another type of assumption is called a logical assumption.
This type of assumption originally would occur when unknown information 
was involved. The various possible values would have been examined.
If, for each case it was determined that the precondition could be satisfied, 
the precondition would be assumed to be logically satisfiable. The infor­
mation derived from searching all of the possibilities should some how 
be saved so that an assumption could be made if the proper conditions are 
met.
In many cases a precondition can be assumed to be satisfiable 
if certain relationships exist between the precondition of the operator 
being evaluated and the precondition of any operator used to satisfy the
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original precondition. This is called a dominance assumption. An operator, 
0P1, is defined to dominate another operator, 0P2, if all of 0P2's pre­
conditions are among the preconditions of 0P1 with the same relationship 
restricting any variables for which values have not been determined. Now, 
if a precondition of 0P1 may be possibly satisfied by the application of 
0P2, then the precondition may be assumed to be satisfiable by dominance.
In the previous two cases, the assumptions which could be made 
are very dependent upon the planning environment which exists when a 
precondition is encountered. Hopefully, this will lead to a system which 
has a better knowledge of what it is trying to accomplish at any given 
time as well as a knowledge of situation methods of dealing with the 
preconditions.
The last type of assumption which has thus far been considered 
has been called a linkage assumption. This type of assumption arises 
because the lack of knowledge concerning the exact order of execution of a 
plan satisfying part of a top level goal will cause unknown information to 
exist. In this case the information is known in the real world but: may be 
altered during planning of another plan. In many cases the overall goal 
will be divided into subplans, each of which is developed independently.
The exact order in which the plans will be executed may not be known at 
the time of planning. When trying to satisfy certain preconditions, a 
planner may examine the real-world database (as opposed to a local, planning 
database). But information found in the real world database may be altered 
by other subplans by the time the subplan is actually executed. The system 
must have knowledge of whether database entries are expected to change.
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For those that are expected to change, the appropriate assumption may be that 
the precondition will be satisfiable during the execution phase.
The last type of assumption mentioned is basically restricted to 
attributes which are expected to change. There are some types of information 
which are not expected to change (even though they may). In these cases, 
the system may use values found in the latest real world model. But these 
should be noted in the plan being produced.
Another problem concerns when the system should initiate execution. 
This also involves the question of how detailed should the planning be.
In theory, the execution could be initiated during any stage of planning. 
However, a more realistic approach would have the execution begin when a 
"reasonable" plan has been developed. In some cases the initial course of 
action may be so well defined (or may be the only alternative) that the 
system may decide to start execution before the initial planning has terminated. 
Observations, which are a type of execution, could be performed at any time 
during planning or execution if the proper conditions occur in the real world.
After the plan outlines satisfying portions of the top level goals 
have been generated, it is necessary to link them into a coherent plan 
outline. To do this, an order of execution must be determined and intermediate 
connecting programs must be developed. The subplans are classed according 
to the criticalities of the tasks which are satisfied. An attempt is 
made to link the highly rated subplans to the initial world. When a "shortest" 
linkage is found to a subplan, this subplan is assumed to be executed next. 
Linkage is attempted between the remaining subplans and the world model of
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the most recently assumed executed subplan. This continues until all of 
the subplans have been linked.
Among the major problems which still must be considered for effective 
linking include: how to distinguish between the case when two subplans of
different criticalities have the same initial environment condition and 
should be executed consecutively and the case when the lower criticality 
subplan must be executed with subplans of its own criticality to avoid 
making other subplans undoable; what types of searches are necessary to 
promote the most "efficient" linkage for the entire plan. Surely a most 
efficient first linkage is not enough.
It would be very desirable to have the system be aware not only of 
what part of the plan it is executing but also the knowledge needs and 
preconditions of other subplans. In the present formalation, an attempt 
is being made to obtain this type of performance. When observations are 
needed and the necessary environment does not exist, the required environment 
would be stored so that should the opportunity arise, the observations 
could be made. Certain aspects of the world could be protected as pre­
conditions for future subplans, top-level goals as well as any currently 
active operators. If a subplan tries to undo another subplan's initial 
assumptions, the planner being constructed will be warned of this.
In some cases, while a plan is being executed and during an 
observation, some previously unknown information is acquired. This new 
information may lead the system to re-evaluate the manner in which the overall 
goal is to be satisfied. This may involve satisfying a subgoal with a 
different operator and/or altering the order in which subplans are executed.
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For this type of performance to occur, the system must be aware of some of 
the important possible cases: new information leading to alternate plans,
and new information leading to short cuts.
When trying to satisfy a goal, the system may be considering 
several possible approaches. A situation which can occur is that after 
planning has been successful through a certain criticality, a failure 
due to unknown information is encountered. In the previous cases discussed, 
it was possible to "assume" that the precondition could be satisfied, 
but this is not always the case. If the unknown precondition is found to 
be satisfied, the system should be able to pause and consider the new 
information. If a new subplan were found which was expected to be superior, 
the linkages may have to be reformulated. In most cases, it is not expected 
that this would alter the composition of other subplans. When the subplan 
is being reformulated, other unknown failures may still be encountered 
which may dissuade the system from pursuing these paths.
The possibility of a short-cut also may occur when a failure due 
to unknown information is encountered during planning. In this case, 
the operator which was being considered when the failure occurred is later 
found to be potentially useful in the finally constructed plan. To deter­
mine this, the system examines the failure and subplan produced and asks 
the questions: 1) Is the operator which was being examined when the
failure occurred still potentially useful in that the change the action 
would have yielded was realized in some manner later on in the plan (or more 
precisely, did planning continue until a subplan to realize the action goal 
was obtained)? 2) If the failed precondition were assumed to be true,
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would all of the operator's preconditions be satisfied or satisfiable to a 
certain criticality?
If these conditions are met, then the plan should be altered to 
indicate that if the precondition is found to be true, an alternate 
shorter subplan could replace part of the plan without affecting any 
of the other linkages or subplans. It is hoped that this type of planning 
will not only make the system more responsive to new information which is 
received, but will also allow the system to demonstrate a better under­
standing of what it is trying to do at all levels of planning and execution-,
In some of the situations being considered, the cost of performing 
an action and probabilities of the possible values of the unknown informa­
tion have been included as unspecified parameters. It is sometimes possible 
to judge the superiority of one plan over another with only this information.
4.1.4. Conclusions
Systems which are to be able to plan and execute solutions to real 
world problems must be able to plan in incompletely specified environments.
The system should have the knowledge that certain relevant information 
may not be known at all stages of planning. The system should be able to 
form a plan outline indicating the "major" steps. For various situations, 
it should be able to assume that certain tasks are satisfiable, deferring 
planning until a time just before execution. The system should have the 
ability to initiate execution beforeplanning has terminated. As new 
information is received, the plan and/or flow of execution should be modifiable.
I
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When planning for CADM, the system should be cognizant of the
overall mission outline. Using knowledge of pilot and system capabilities,
the plan which is constructed should be compatible with the mission
objective.
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4.2. Man-Computer Systems
4.2.1. Introduction
The design of man-computer systems presents an array of traditional 
problems as well as new problems that become especially significant when the 
computer system has some "intelligence". We have more experience with the 
traditional problems and some definitive answers exist. However, there is 
little research upon which to base solutions to the new problems. In this 
section of this report, we will discuss approaches to both types of problems.
4.2.2. Displays and Controls
Traditional display and control considerations are what to display, 
how to display it, and what form inputs should take. The question of what to 
display could easily be answered if we knew what information the pilot needed 
to make his decisions (Williams, 1947). Unfortunately, we have not completely 
answered this question in the almost 30 years since Williams' report. The 
result is that designers tend to give the decision maker (DM) any piece of 
information they think he might use. This can result in an information glut, 
increased workload, and degraded performance.
Based on a recent survey (Rouse, 1975), we can make some general 
design recommendations for displays and controls for man-computer systems. 
Display parameters of importance include luminance, contrast, regeneration 
rate, character size and generation method, interpolation schemes, and displays 
for quantitative information.
The preferred values for luminance, contrast, and regeneration rate 
are 50 ML, 94%, and 50 HZ, respectively. Characters should subtend 15 minutes 
of arc and dot matrices should be at least 10 in height with a height to width 
ratio of 7:5 to 3:2. Linear interpolation for the display of discrete
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information can bias the statistical properties of the information which 
can in turn degrade DM's performance. Higher order interpolations seem to 
lessen this difficulty except they are much more difficult to generate in 
real time. For static reading of quantitative information, digital displays 
(counters) are preferred while for dynamic reading, hybrid displays (counters 
and dials) are appropriate.
The question of how to display information is also affected by 
the status quo in the sense that one could not expect pilots, or any other 
DM, to learn a completely new set of conventions, jargon, etc. Thus, display 
choices must allow for smooth transfer of training.
„ While the inputs required from DM are fairly well defined by the 
task, the form of the inputs is reasonably free to innovation. (Again, 
with the transfer of training constraint.) However, many of the numerous 
input devices available to the self-paced, non-moving DM are not practical 
for a DM who is the operator of a highly dynamic vehicle in a forced-pace 
situation.
There are numerous input devices for man-computer interaction. 
However, devices such as keyboard, light pen, rand tablet, and the SRI mouse 
are inappropriate since the keyboard is awkward and its data input rate is 
low. Light pens and styluses are easily misplaced. The mouse could easily 
lose its orientation in a dynamic environment. . Joysticks, trackballs, and 
small keyboards (E.G., "touchtone") are more appropriate for the operator 
of a vehicle, pilots are familiar with joysticks. The 4 X 3  keyboard was 
used on Apollo. Thus there are precedents for these devices.
4.2.3. Task Allocation and Conflict Resolution
Perhaps the most crucial issue in the area of man-computer interaction
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is the allocation of tasks and responsibility between DM and the computer. 
While we have a general feeling for what each should do (Licklider, 1960), 
reducing these principles to practice is often very difficult. Part of this 
difficulty stems from the computer not being able to perform many of the 
tasks that one would like to allocate to it. However, artificial intelligence 
(AI) may, in the future, produce systems capable of such performance.
The allocation of tasks between DM and AI presents three basic 
difficulties. While one might consider giving AI any task that it could 
perform acceptably, this may be inappropriate. DM should be given a task 
or sequence of actions that has some coherency (if only for motivational 
reasons). In addition, there is a possibility of underloading the DM 
which results in vigilance problems and degraded performance. Thus, if the 
human is to be part of the system, maintaining his overall performance 
may require that he be allocated some tasks that he performs at a level 
inferior to that of the computer.
Another issue that must be considered is DM’s confidence in AI.
If DM is to willingly give some decision making responsibility to AI, he 
must be confident that AI is competent and operational (has not failed).
Thus, DM needs some feedback on what AI is doing. However, DM does not want 
to know the details since it is unlikely that DM has the time to consider 
such additional information. (Or, why is the computer being used in the 
first place?)
Further difficulties stem from what we will call ’’competitive 
intelligence". With the feasibility of DM and AI sharing responsibility 
for tasks, the possibility emerges that DM and AI may not agree on what to
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do. In a self-paced task, this would not be too difficult to arbitrate since 
DM and AI could pause for a moment and debate the relative merits of each 
other's approach. Most likely, DM would be left with the final decision of 
whose approach to adopt. However, in a forced-pace, highly dynamic situation, 
there is no time for debate. A competitively-intelligent system might result 
in a much higher workload for DM since he would have to continually monitor 
AI. In some situations, competitive intelligence might lead to system instability. 
The solution is to design a "cooperatively intelligent" system.
Now we will consider the above ideas in more detail and suggest how 
we might solve the problems posed by these difficulties.
An initial consideration is the characterization of the decision 
making abilities of AI. The real world is not as neat and regular as the 
Laboratory and it is unrealistic to think that AI will out-perform DM in any 
robust set of tasks. AI has yet to perform many, if any, comprehensive human 
information processing and decision making tasks (Miller, 1974). Yet, AI 
need not perform a task better than DM to justify allocating responsibility 
for that task to AI. If DMhasmany tasks to perform, he may not be able to 
devote sufficient time to each task to achieve acceptable overall performance.
If AI could perform tolerably well in some of the tasks, DM would be free to 
concentrate on a smaller set of tasks.
What tasks should AI perform? An initial and naive approach is 
to allocate to AI any task or subtask that it can perform at an acceptable 
level. This can present severe difficulties if DM and AI perform subtasks 
of the same task or highly intersecting tasks. The problem is that the 
actions which DM and AI initiate may be jointly counterproductive. In some
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situations, they may be working against each other and not realize it. Or, 
they may realize it, but see no alternative. This phenomenon is competitive 
intelligence. As a perhaps unrealistic example, consider a situation where 
a pilot decides to dump fuel to solve an aircraft imbalance problem while 
AI decides to re-route fuel to solve the same problem. The result would be 
a loss of fuel without correcting the imbalance problem, not to mention the 
wasted attention of the pilot and AI.
A solution to the competitive intelligence problem might be to 
allocate to DM and AI sets of tasks that have little intersection (across 
decision makers). This may be appropriate in some situations, but it is 
difficult to construct sets of tasks with completely independent consequences. 
For example, a highly integrated system like an aircraft results in sets of 
tasks with many interdependencies.
If tasks are to intersect, DM and AI must know what each other is 
doing. DM could memorize all of AI's decision making procedures and thus 
be able to react appropriately to AI's decisions. However, this would 
probably result in increased workload and certainly more training. An 
alternative is to have AI know (or learn) DM's procedures and adapt its 
actions to DM's so as to maximize system performance. This type of system 
would exhibit cooperative intelligence.
Reconsidering allocation of tasks, DM and AI should each be given 
coherent sets of tasks with as little intersection across decision maker 
responsibility as possible. AI should respond in its tasks according to 
both the system state and what the DM is doing. This sounds rather neat 
yet two other issues need to be discussed before we look at the ramifications
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of these ideas for CADM.
While an AI system like that described above might remove some of 
DM's processing load, it will not necessarily do so, since there is a non-zero 
probability that AI will "hang-up" or experience a hardware failure, DM still 
must monitor AI. If this probability is high, DM might actually spend more 
time monitoring AI than he would have spent if he had performed the tasks 
himself. A solution to this problem might be to let AI monitor itself. In 
other words, AI should be able to determine when it knows what it is doing, 
when it is having difficulty, and when it cannot handle a problem normally 
assigned to it. (Naturally, this approach assumes that AI has sufficient 
intelligence to know how intelligent it is.)
This is the principle upon which we based the green, yellow and 
red indicators noted in an earlier section. With these indicators, the 
pilot need not be concerned with the details of what AI is doing and only 
need divert his attention if some difficulty arises. While this approach 
partially handles the problem of DM knowing how AI is doing, it does depend 
on putting self-monitoring capability in AI and on the pilot being confident 
in AI.
A last issue to consider is dynamic allocation of tasks. When AI 
experiences difficulty or DM is facing an increased workload situation, they 
may want to shift responsibility for some tasks. In the first situation, 
when AI is having trouble, the difficulty is in smoothing transitions of 
responsibility. How do you give to DM all the information that AI has been 
using but DM has not been considering? The second situation where DM wants 
to shift some responsibility to AI is less difficult since AI would have
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been keeping track of what DM was doing. However, defining exactly what DM 
wants AI to do may be somewhat difficult unless there are only a rather 
restrictive set of alternatives. Dynamic task allocation has not been 
considered in much detail during this phase of the CADM project. It will 
be discussed later in this report as a possible avenue of future work.
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5. FUTURE PLANS
At this point, after successfully demonstrating a fundamental 
capability to apply the concepts of Artificial Intelligence to the detection 
and correction of single and multiple failures in a simplified airplane 
system, we plot the course for our future research efforts. The choices 
of directions were many and may have taken any of several diverse paths.
But in designing a suggested approach for Phase 3, an effective and expedient 
balance has been maintained between the development of new ideas and physical 
demonstration of their feasibility.
Basically our distinct choices were whether to concentrate on 
filling out our present system to discover and demonstrate its ultimate 
capability, or whether to launch out into more long range problems that 
challence the state-of-the-art in Artificial Intelligence. Because of the 
assumed desirability of performing both research and demonstration, a coherent 
selection of tasks from each group have been chosen to be accomplished. Of 
the many available tasks, we have chosen to focus on those which exhibit or 
improve CADM flexibility and ability to accommodate different operating 
environments. The key criteria in attaining these goals are the degrees to 
which we are able to integrate an advanced CADM and appropriate pilot-CADM 
interaction so that true cooperative intelligence emerges.
Numerous first order extensions to our airplane failure model have 
been considered. For instance, we propose to expand our present airplane 
system to incorporate sensitivity to mission profile changes. This is 
discussed more fully in the proposed navigati on system task below. The
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impact on our present CADM failure model is a required dynamic reordering 
(according to whether the plane is landing, taking off, cruising, etc.) 
of our presently static hierarchy of failures, both as to criticality and 
to order of steps within the failure correction program. Additionally, we 
propose to investigate and expand the degrees of pilot-CADM interaction 
our present system allows. The slow interface between the operating programs 
and the current data base in our present model may be obscuring a potentially 
rich and interesting area. For instance, the "ultimate degraded mode", i.e., 
partical or complete CADM failure requiring (hopefully intelligent) transfer 
of some or all tasks to the pilot might offer some formidable problems. So 
also might the re-assumption of some tasks by CADM if repair or restructuring 
of CADM during the mission is accomplished.
Additionally, we propose to add a navigation system to our model 
so that a wider variety of more interesting and realistic problems may be 
attacked. The present airplane dynamic model seems sufficient for our 
tasks and we anticipate no further attempts to complicate it. Rather, we 
propose to expand the demonstration to include activities, situations, and 
data originating outside the aircraft. We propose a navigation task that 
requires the airplane to travel from one point on an xy plane to another 
with limited aircraft resources and with external obstructions such as 
weather storms, fixed ground obstacles, and other moving aircraft. The 
navigation task allows us to introduce an uncertainty factor as well as to 
increase the complexity of the data base. The current simulation lacks this 
aspect of the real world. At present all failures have known penalities 
and all alternative actions have known benefits. Not only is it important
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to have uncertainty in the simulation, but also it is necessary to bring in 
the concept of mission goals. The success or failure of a CADM system in 
actual flight operations will be measured by whether or not it helps to 
achieve these mission goals. These goals go beyond the "keep the airplane 
flying" concept we currently use. There are, in fact, several constraining 
facts of flight which a decision maker must take into account (ROSCOE-MAN 
AS A PRECIOUS RESOURCE:-). These include:
-the performance characteristics and present 
condition of the aircraft;
-the presence and flight paths of traffic in 
the vicinity;
-the weather both local and enroute;
-the geography and topography of the terrain over 
which and against which the flight is made;
-any characteristics of the crew that would impose 
limits on the flight; and 
-the body of rules that governs flight in that 
particular airspace.
A navigation task will provide a vehicle for presenting these constraining 
facts of flight to the pilot-CADM system.
A necessary prerequisite for a viable simulation at Aviation Research 
Laboratory will be a higher bandwidth communication link between ARL and CSL 
computers than now exists. A synchronous 9600 baud telephone line connection 
will be built for this purpose. This will require support hardware and
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software on the CSL PDP-11 as well as some time on the CSL PDP-11. The current 
phase will see the installation of the equipments and writing of the necessary 
software for this link.
In the effort to complete our degraded mode operation analysis, 
making CADM a learning machine that attempts to discover why its choices of 
action were not successful, one that has some self model so that elementary 
automatic programming and debugging is done seems fruitful for investigation. 
This is a logical first step in discovering a weapon system that refines its 
judgements and improves with age and experience, in much the same way a pilot 
does. For example, the ability to abandon a slow failure correction procedure 
and opt for a faster one that suddenly becomes available is fundamental to 
efficiency and intelligence. This is relevent where any one of a number of 
multiple failures may be occupying (and then releasing for use by other 
failures) software failure correction procedures. Along similar lines, CADM 
as a problem solver that expands its data base and performs logical deduction 
and decision making will be investigated. For instance, during an attempt 
to correct a failure, CADM may discover that a usually effective correction 
procedure suddenly has no effect. CADM should then hypothesize that all air 
system components required by this procedure are inoperative and create a list 
of these components. CADM should then drop from or retain on the list 
components successfully or unsuccessfully used by other correction procedures 
until the defective component has been identified. Additionally, though it 
is not clear at this point that adaptive failure correction, i.e., trying to 
decide before beginning correction which procedure is likely to be more 
efficient, is more intelligent or faster than hierarchical list processing
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CADM now does, this also appears to be a fertile area of investigation.
We also propose that the advanced Phase 3 CADM be able to operate 
effectively with some incomplete and possibly conflicting data. For instance, 
in addition to the weather and traffic uncertainties previously discussed, 
we plan to expand our airplane system to allow sensor failure and redundant 
sensor conflict. CADM will then be extended to cope with the situation.
Of utmost necessity during Phase 3 is the enhancement of the 
symbiotic relationship between the pilot and CADM. We propose to concentrate 
on four main efforts. First, the data displays and techniques necessary for 
effective interface will be investigated. The MASTER MONITOR DISPLAY may be 
enhanced to allow the pilot to request more detailed information about the 
aircraft. This additional information may be presented in the form of 
annotated schematics perhaps in a manner similar to Hughes (Hughes, 1974). 
Also we want to allow some form of direct pilot-CADM communication.
The second main effort will be that of proving the feasibility 
of using a model to predict pilot perceptions. This will probably require 
more than a single parameter per axis. It would seem that variations in 
the crossover model time delay would give additional information about the 
pilot's allocation of attention. Thus, these parameters (one for each axis) 
will be identified instead of assuming them fixed. We also plan to look at 
various identification algorithms and consider sample size, time, and 
accuracy tradeoffs.
A third effort will consider dynamic task allocation. This will 
include investigation of the human's ability to make such allocation 
decisions as well as how masses of information can be transferred with
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the responsibility for a task. Also of interest is CADM's ability to make 
allocation decisions and thereby lessen the pilot's decision making load.
The fourth major effort is the rigorous experimental evaluation 
of program intelligence to the pilot. Subjects will perform various flight 
maneuvers with and without CADM detecting and correcting failures. With 
these experiments, we will be able to determine whether or not CADM signifi­
cantly affects the overall system performance and how the effects are related 
to the difficulty of the pilot's task.
In conclusion, our Phase 3 research effort will focus on four key 
attributes: flexibility, interaction, the ability to take advantage of past
experience, and compatibility with present and future Phase 4 goals. The 
proposed navigation task will provide an efficient transition to Phase 4, 
which requires a system demonstration using facilities at the Aviation 
Research Laboratory (ARL). The ARL, through ongoing research has developed 
physical resources and a capability for research on navigation problems. By 
orienting the CADM task toward this general area, we can take advantage of 
equipments and software that already exist. The flexibility is dictated by 
the multi-mission multi-profile aircraft that will operate during the 1980's. 
Interaction is necessary for pilot confidence and for efficiency in dynamic 
task allocation. Ability to change parameters, procedures, or structure 
based on prior failures and successes seems basic to intelligence, whether 
real or artificial. Our thrust will be to provide an expanded airplane 
subsystem, an advanced CADM capable of operating in environments containing
t
some uncertainty, and an expanded and improved pilot-CADM interface.
